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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers why the United States Air Force is still flying combat air 
patrols (CAPs) over the United States in support of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) more 
than seven years after 9/11.   The USAF is struggling to support two regional conflicts 
while defending the homeland and trying sustain and recapitalize its fleet of aircraft.  
Given these broader long-term requirements, it is time to reevaluate the need for ONE’s 
costly airborne CAPs, in light of improvements in aviation security, together with the 
absence of terrorist attacks on the homeland and of no actionable intelligence indicating 
an imminent air threat in America.  The following sub-areas were researched to help 
evaluate and recommend changes to the current ONE CAP policy:  the history of air 
defense in America; U.S. air defense mistakes on 9/11 and the evolution of ONE; 
improvements in the intelligence community and aviation security since 9/11; specific 
threats to aviation and the risk of another 9/11-style attack in the United States; and the 
cost and impact of the ONE alert and CAP missions on the combat capability of the 
participating USAF squadrons.  The thesis concludes by considering other, more cost-
effective, air defense systems available to support Noble Eagle in lieu of fighter CAPs. 
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I. OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The key research questions analyzed are: Why is the U.S. Air Force (USAF) still 
flying combat air patrols (CAPs) in support of the post 9/11 air defense mission called 
“Operation Noble Eagle” (ONE), and does the policy need to change?  Answering these 
questions requires that we understand the history of air defense in American and how 
ONE evolved into its current steady state in order to evaluate the Air Force’s continued 
support of this costly homeland defense operation despite many other competing calls 
upon its limited resources.   
The following sub-areas were researched to help evaluate the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) current Noble Eagle policy and answer the primary research questions.   
- History of air defense in America. 
- U.S. air defense performance on 9/11.  
- Key changes in aviation security since 9/11 to help mitigate the risk. 
- Threats to aviation and the risk of another 9/11 type attack. 
- Impact of ONE on USAF active duty and ANG fighter squadrons. 
- Other air defense options available. 
- Are the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the ANG on a 
course of path dependence and what are the effects of bureaucratic politics on the 
current ONE policy? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
President George Bush authorized the mobilization of 35,000 ANG and reservists 
on 15 September 2001 for HD and civil support (CS) in response to the terrorist attacks 
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on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.1  The mission was called “Operation Noble 
Eagle.”  Part of the operation included fighter aircraft flying combat air patrols over cities 
throughout the country as well as sitting on ground alert.2  The fighters were armed and 
had the responsibility of intercepting and potentially shooting down hijacked aircraft.  
ONE fighter missions were initially supported by ANG and reserve squadrons but were 
soon augmented by the active duty U.S. Air Force.3  Eventually the active duty fighter 
squadrons took over most of the long duration ONE CAP missions as well as some of the 
alert commitments.  The ANG squadrons, who traditionally have been responsible for the 
homeland defense mission, provide some support for short-duration ONE CAPs but 
mostly sit ground alert with their fighter aircraft.4   
Since 9/11, the Air Force has flown over 184,000 hours during over 50,000 sorties 
within the continental United States, ostensibly in support of the war on terror.5  The 
sorties involve flying endless circular CAPs over major cities, critical infrastructure (CI) 
and special national events.  These missions have had a negative impact on the training 
and readiness of the pilots, jets, and the squadrons involved.6    By 2005, Operation 
Noble Eagle had already cost the Department of Defense (DoD) more than $27 billion 
and the combat air patrols have continued despite the absence of any clear intelligence 
about specific air threat(s) to our homeland defense.7   
                                                 
1 “Operation Noble Eagle,” GlobalSecurity.org, 27 April 2005, 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/noble-eagle.htm (accessed 25 April 2008). 
2  Adam J. Hebert, “Homeland Air Force,” Air Force Magazine, (January 2004): 36-40.  
3  John L. Conway III, “AEF and Homeland Security: The Air National Guard’s Competing Roles,” 
Quick-Look 04-26, http://research.airuniv.edu (accessed 25 April 2008). 
4 Conway, 1. 
5 “AFNORTH Sortie Count,”  1st Air Force, 1 October 2007, www.1af.acc.af.mil/ (accessed 23 May 
2008). 
6 Otto Kreisher, “The Years of Noble Eagle,” Air Force Magazine, June 2007, 52. 
7 Kreisher, 50-54.  Adam J. Hebert, “Noble Eagle Without End,” Air Force Magazine, February 2005, 
42-47. John L. Conway III, “AEF and Homeland Security: The ANG’s Competing Roles,” Quick-Look 04-
26, http://research.airuniv.edu (accessed 25 October 2007). 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Something needed to be done to ensure security of our skies immediately after the 
attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon.  Seven years later, however, 
there is no clear reason why are we are still flying CAPs and executing ONE as a “steady 
state” operation in the same basic form put in place on the day of the attacks.  Countless 
man-hours, thousands of flight hours, and billions of dollars later we are still sitting alert 
and flying random CAPs around the country. Without credible intelligence of threats, the 
national leadership and the USAF need to tailor combat air force’s (CAF) defense posture 
accordingly and not expend our nation’s finite resources on a mission whose strategic 
payoff appears to be extremely limited.    
In 1958, at the height of the Cold War, there were over 100 active and ANG bases 
with 1,500 fighter-interceptors on alert.8  After the Cold War, the alert commitment fell 
drastically to only 14 aircraft at seven ANG bases in the continental U.S. on 9/11.9  
Following the 9/11 attacks, the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) and ANG’s 1st Air Force dusted off their Cold War air defense plans for the 
“new threat” and reopened a number of closed alert facilities around the country.   By 
2002, NORAD and the ANG had gained additional federal funding and expanded their 
alert commitments to 30 bases.  “Compared to mid-2001, the ANG has more than five 
times as many airmen devoted to the HD alert mission.”10  Operation Noble Eagle has 
become a political and financial success for the NORAD and the ANG, but its combat air 
patrols have become an unnecessary burden on the combat air forces.   
The policy supporting Operation Noble Eagle CAPs was initially driven by the 
desire to prevent another terrorist attack employing commercial aircraft; yet the Air 
Force’s current air defense force structure and the use of CAPs is modeled on Cold War 
bomber defense paradigms.  This research will take a critical look at this apparent 
                                                 
8 John Pike, “Operation Noble Eagle,” GlobalSecurity.org, 27 April 2005, 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/noble-eagle.htm (accessed 3 November 2007). 
9 MSNBC, “9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 17,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 27 June 2004, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5233007/ (accessed 3 November 2007). 
10 Hebert, 36. 
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mismatch of ends, ways, and means, in order to determine if we are simply following a 
course of path dependence for Homeland Defense and/or if bureaucratic politics are 
preventing a course correction in the ONE policy for using combat air patrols.   
The preliminary hypothesis that will guide this research indicates the ONE policy 
needs to be reevaluated and the random combat air patrols discontinued.  This hypothesis 
is based on four key preliminary inferences derived from mission experience up to now: 
1) there have been significant improvements in intelligence coordination and aviation 
security over the last seven years that have reduced risk and minimized the threat; 2) 
there is no intelligence indicating a specific aviation-related threat to the homeland; 3) the 
cost of the CAPs to the Air Force in terms of dollars and impact on combat capability 
outweighs the strategic benefits of Noble Eagle as currently conceived; and 4.) alert 
fighters, along with more cost effective ground-based air defense systems, are sufficient 
to protect special events and critical infrastructure in America. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Very little academic literature or debate relates to Operation Noble Eagle and the 
use of fighters from homeland defense.  Most of the information written about the subject 
is historical or informational articles found in journals such as AIR FORCE Magazine or 
policy documents.  The lack of public debate about ONE may be an indication that the 
politicians, the Air Force, and the public have simply accepted the mission with little 
thought to its cost and/or utility.   
This thesis is a review of contemporary air defense history and strategies which 
will seek to explain some of the factors that have led to the current policy for Operation 
Noble Eagle and its use of combat air patrols. It will use the theories of path dependence 
and bureaucratic politics to help explain why the ANG and NORAD continue to support 
the CAP missions, even though they have become a costly steady state operation that 
have lasted for over seven years after the 9/11 attacks.  The aim of this thesis is to 




impact on Air Force combat capability.  It will conclude by recommending policy 
changes intended to better align costs and benefits within the framework of overall Air 
Force operations.   
Path dependence is a central concern for the analysis of the ONE policy.  It occurs 
when institutions become self reinforcing.  It can be initiated by decisions that at the time 
seem “inconsequential but lead to uncontrollable consequences.”11 Douglas Puffert says 
“History matters, it has an enduring influence…choices made on the basis of transitory 
conditions can persist long after those conditions change.”12  “Lock-in” is an important 
concept in path dependence.  It means “having to accept inferior standards, even though 
superior alternatives exist…and the costs of switching are not high.”13   
Much research within the area of bureaucratic politics refers to the popular theory 
called “Miles’ Law.”  Miles is credited with the phrase, “Where you stand depends on 
where you sit.” Though his research is not specific to security policy, it does portray an 
organizational dynamic in which individual judgments are strongly influenced by the 
institution to which the individual belongs; a process characterized by careerism and 
defense of individual empires.14 The Bureaucratic Politics approach will offer analytical 
insight into the current Operation Noble Eagle policy and the desire for those involved to 
keep promoting the mission.   
The majority of sources for the thesis will be secondary (professional journals, 
news media, books, and internet resources).  Primary sources will also be used chiefly in 
the form of phone interviews and email correspondence with people currently involved in 
the U.S. air defense mission.   
                                                 
11 Stan Leibowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Policy and Path Dependence,” Regulation, The Cato 
Review of Business & Government (Fall 1995) http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg18n3.html (accessed 
6 December 2007). 
12 Douglas Puffert, “Path Dependence” EH.Net 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/puffert.path.dependence (accessed 6 December 2007). 
13 Leibowitz. 
14 Rufus E. Miles Jr., “The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law.” Public Administration Review 38, no. 
5 (Sep.-Oct., 1978) 399-403. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will cover a broad range of issues in order to provide the necessary 
background to make an informed policy decision for modifying the combat air patrol 
requirements for Operation Noble Eagle. The thesis is divided into seven chapters.  
Chapter I will cover the purpose of the thesis, its importance, problems, hypotheses, 
methods and sources, and the thesis overview.  Chapter II will provide a brief history of 
air defense in American before 9/11 to give the reader some background for how ONE 
has gone almost full circle back into the Cold War air defense structure.  Chapter III, like 
the War and Navy Departments’ reaction to and after the Pearl Harbor experience, the 
DoD was very sensitive after 9/11 to the possibility of additional criticism that would 
follow another surprise attack that they were not prepared to counter.  This chapter will 
review the air defense response and mistakes on 9/11, and the subsequent evolution of 
Noble Eagle.  It will also provide insight into our current ONE basing, force structure, 
and mission.  Chapter IV will evaluate the threats to aviation that fighter aircraft in an air 
defense role can counter.  It will also summarize the major changes in aviation security 
and the intelligence community (IC) since 9/11.  A general vulnerability assessment is 
provided in this chapter for a risk based decision analysis on the likelihood of another 
9/11 hijacked aircraft attack.  Chapter V will research the costs/benefit of ONE and 
evaluate its impact on the combat capability of USAF active duty and ANG squadrons.  
Chapter VI will look at using more cost effective alternatives including using ground 
based air defense systems in lieu of air patrols.  Chapter VII will complete this thesis by 
summarizing the findings and offer the academic theories of path dependence and 
bureaucratic politics as a possible explanation for why it appears that decision makers 
have allowed the Operation Noble Eagle CAPs to continue in their current “steady state” 
unchallenged.  The chapter will conclude by recommending a new policy of using 
combat air patrols in America only with clear and actionable intelligence indicating that a 
specific threat from the air exists for a special event with national security interest, a key 
political person, or a piece of critical infrastructure.   
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II. U.S. AIR DEFENSE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 2001 
A. THE RISE AND FALL OF AIR DEFENSE IN AMERICA  
1. Air Defense during World War II 
Air defense has been part of our country now for almost 100 years.  Alexander 
Graham Bell warned about the possibility of German airship raids on the U.S. in 1916.15 
Many experts studied the problem of air defense before WWII as aircraft acquired the 
kinds of capabilities that could turn theory into practice.  Aviation pioneers like Brigadier 
General “Billy” Mitchell built the foundation for the future of Air Defense in America.  
Traditionally, the U.S. military’s airpower defended the nation through projection of 
force around the world.  Prior to WWII, defending the homeland was a strategic problem 
that depended on forward defenses and the physical distance to potential threats.  That 
strategy changed after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The “Rainbow” plan 
proposed by the U.S. War Department in 1940 to defend the homeland included 2,000 
Army and Navy aircraft on continuous patrols of the coastlines.16 This plan called for too 
many of our scarce combat aircraft resources and was eventually scaled back as the threat 
to the homeland subsided and the overseas conflicts in Europe and the Pacific 
intensified.17 
Air Defense Command (ADC) was established in 1940 and assigned the mission 
of defending the continental United States (CONUS) from aerial attack.  It maintained 
that mission for almost 40 years.18  During WWII, the ADC was organized into four 
Numbered Air Forces and was divided into separate air defense districts (see Figure 1).19  
                                                 
15 Walter  J. Boyne, “The Rise of Air Defense,” Air Force Magazine, (December 1999), 1-6. 
16 Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 215-231.   
17 Simon Rigge, War in the Outposts, World War II (Alexandria, VA.: Time Life Books, 1980), 10. 
18 Kenneth Schaffel, The Emerging Shield: the Air Force and the Evolution of Continental Air 
Defenses, 1945-1960 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1991), 278.   
19 AF Historical Research, http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/rso/rso_index.html (accessed 20 August 08). 
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Air Defense Command used active and passive measures to defend the country.  Active 
measures included fighter aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, and barrage balloons (airborne 
obstacles).  Passive measures included blackouts, dispersion of critical infrastructure, and 
camouflage designed to limit the effects of an enemy attack.20  The ADC also flew 
coastal patrols looking for enemy submarines in a effort to help protect our ports and 
shipping lanes.21  Air Defense Command shifted their focus to training replacement 
combat pilots for overseas deployments as the threat of attack on the U.S. homeland 
diminished in 1942.22   
 
Figure 1.   ADC Structure During WWII23 
2. The Air Defense Command in the Early Cold War (1946-1952) 
During World War II, the U.S. and Canada maintained “strategic direction and 
command of their own armed forces” while cooperating in the fight against the Axis 
Powers.24  This relationship continued after the war over concerns of attack from the ever 
                                                 
20 War Department Field Manual FM100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), Section IV. 
21 Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: Army Air Forces in World War II (New York: Random House, 
1993), 83.   
22 1st Air Force, “History of 1st Air Force,”  
http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4106 (accessed 27 August 2008). 
23 Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. “ADC,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Command 
(accessed 23 August 2008). 
24 Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North 
American Air Defense, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 13.   
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present but singular threat from the Soviet Union and their massive bomber fleet.  
Although it took several years for the U.S. to react to the air threat from the Soviets 
because Air Defense Command’s force structure was cut drastically after World War II 
during a period of rapid demobilization and slashed budgets.25  At one point in 1946, 
ADC was just a headquarters organization with two squadrons assigned on paper, but no 
aircraft or pilots.  By 1953, an extensive integrated network of fighter aircraft sitting alert 
and flying in defensive combat air patrols (CAPs) along with early warning aircraft, 
ground based radars, and command, control, and communication (C3) centers were 
operation throughout the U.S. and Canada.26   
3. The Height of the Cold War for Air Defense Command (1953-1963) 
The capability for early warning and defense against Soviet bomber attacks 
continued to be important for the DoD and ADC.  Early use of fighter CAPs against 
attacks was endorsed in 1953 in a study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) and adopted by ADC.27  The study recommended placing CAPs along warning 
lines in Canada as a defense in depth to give our fighters a chance to counter the bomber 
attack (see Figure 2).28  Canada realized at this point that it was in their best interest to 
combine forces with the U.S. to counter the expanding Soviet force of long-range nuclear 
bombers.29  A single command structure was needed to maintain tactical control over all 
the complex air defense networks that had been built in an effort to integrate them into a 
unified and joint international command.   
                                                 
25 Boyne, 1. 
26 Boyne, 3. 
27 Jockel, 61-62. 
28 Jockel, 65-68, 89-90. 
29 Major William H. Dawson, The Usefulness of NORAD in the Aerospace Environment (Maxwell 
AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1973), 10.   
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Figure 2.   Early Air Defense Warning and CAP Lines30 
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was established in September 
1957 to improve coordination and cooperation between the Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Canadian air defense forces. The Air Defense Command was also moved under 
NORADs operational control.31  NORAD’s headquarters was established at Peterson Air 
Force Base (AFB), Colorado.  The NORAD commander’s C3 center had the 
responsibility for fusing the sensor systems around the country to provide an integrated 
air and space picture.  Its mission was to detect and process any threats to the U.S. or 
Canada and direct a response while notifying the National Command Authority in both 
countries as necessary.  NORAD’s C3 center was moved inside Cheyenne Mountain, 
Colorado in 1961.32 
                                                 
30 Dawson, 10.   
31 Schaffel, 58.   
32 NORAD, “NORAD History,” http://www.norad.mil/about/history.html (accessed 25 August 2008). 
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NORAD was initially assigned over 250,000 personnel and consisted of 8 
regions, 22 air division (including 2000 fighter and support aircraft), 65 
fighter/interceptor squadrons (see Figure 3), 14 air defense artillery gun batteries, 253 air 
defense missile batteries, and 462 early warning radar and control stations.33   
 
Figure 3.   Cold War ADC Fighter Bases34  
4. The Decline of ADC and NORAD (1964-1989) 
NORAD grew in importance and sophistication but their emphasis shifted as the 
primary threat changed from long-range bombers to strategic defense against inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the early 1960s.  The Air Defense Command 
was reduced in size during this period due to the shift in threats and competition for 
funding. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s “economic moves to pay for U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam” played a role in the decline of America’s homeland air defense 
network against conventional air attacks.35  ADC continued to decline over the next 20 
years as they transitioned to a surveillance mission (mostly with satellites) and became to 
the “Coast Guard of the Air.”36 ADC’s surveillance mission was responsible for deterring 
                                                 
33 Dawson, 12. 
34 Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. “ADC,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Command 
(accessed 23 August 2008). 
35 Dawson,10.   
36 Dawson, 52-55. 
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unauthorized flights in U.S. airspace and early warning of ICBM attacks.37  By early 
1980, ADC had closed its military radars and started using the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) radars as a substitute.38  ADC was deactivated on July 1, 1980.39  
Its fighters “were divided between the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command (TAC), 
Strategic Air Command (SAC)” and NORAD.40  The ADC turned over all their 
surveillance, air defense and fighter-interceptor responsibilities to NORAD.41  The 
decline of conventional air defense in America continued and by 1985, NORAD had only 
55,000 personnel with five dedicated interceptor squadrons assigned to the command 
with augmentation from 11 ANG fighter squadrons.42   
5. NORAD in the Post Cold War and the Rise of the ANG (1990-2001)  
NORAD continued to focus on aerospace warning and control over the U.S. and 
Canada even after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the final disintegration of the Soviet 
threat.43  NORAD directed three subordinate regional headquarters: the Continental U.S. 
Region (CONR) headquartered at Tyndall AFB, Florida, the Alaska Region with its 
headquarters at Elmendorf AFB, and the Canadian Region controlled out of the Canadian 
Forces Base Winnipeg, Manitoba.44  Canada’s participation in NORAD was limited after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union due to budget constraints and internal political pressure.  
“By the early 1990s, the Air National Guard handled 90% of the air defense mission” in 
North America while NORAD struggled to justify their existence and maintain their $500 
million per year in funding for the staffing of their headquarters and for fighter alert 
facilities.45  
                                                 
37 Dawson, 52-55. 
38 Owen E. Jensen, “The Years of Decline: Air Defense from 1960 to 1980,” Strategic Air Defense, 
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989), 32, 40.   
39 Ibid 
40 Boyne, 6. 
41 Jensen, 40. 
42 Douglas Murray, “NORAD and U.S. Nuclear Operations,” in Fifty Years, 220.   
43 NORAD, “About NORAD,” http://www.norad.mil/ (accessed 26 May 2008).   
44 NORAD. 
45 1st Air Force. 
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The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 shifted the focus of the ANG air defense 
fighter forces from defending against Soviet bomber attacks to the U.S. “War on 
Drugs.”46  NORAD used their radar network, C3 facilities, and fighter aircraft to assist 
civilian law enforcement agencies in the detection, tracking, and monitoring of suspected 
drug smugglers trying to enter North America.47  The U.S. military is prohibited under 
federal law and DoD Directive 5525.5 from engaging in law enforcement activities, but 
NORAD was able to provide intelligence and location information to civilian law 
enforcement agencies by scrambling fighters to intercept and identify suspect aircraft 
entering the U.S.48  The cost-benefit of this air defense mission is questionable as drug 
traffickers, like terrorists, are resourceful and innovative and can easily change tactics to 
counter our defenses.  For example, only about 10% of the 880 aircraft intercepted in 
1994 were actually smuggling drugs while “some agencies estimate that only about 5% 
of the drugs coming into the country arrive by air.”49 Most of the planes intercepted by 
NORAD are simply aircraft with wrong transponder identification “squawks,” pilots off 
course or unable to respond because of a malfunctioning radios, or misfiled flight plans.50 
The Air National Guard officially took command of NORAD’s CONR and the 1st 
Air Force (1 AF) located at Tyndall AFB, FL in October 1997, after years of debate about 
the roles and responsibilities of the ANG at home.  The 1 AF became the first ANG 
numbered air force responsible for executing the air defense mission in North America.51   
Budget cuts in the ‘90s forced NORAD and the ANG to continue to scale back 
their alert fighter forces.  The CONUS rapid response fighter force consisted of only 14 
aircraft at seven bases sitting at 15 minute ground alert on 9/11 (see Figure 4).52   
                                                 
46 Pat McKenna, “The Border Guards-NORAD: The eyes and ears of North America,” Airman 40, no. 
1 (1 January 1996), 7.   
47 Sue McMillin, “NORAD adding its muscle to the fight against drugs,” Air Force Times, 24 
September 2001, 25.   
48 McMillin, 25. 
49 McKenna, 7. 
50 McEnna, 7. 
51 1st Air Force History.   
52 Bradley Graham, “Eagle Eyes Over the Homeland: False Alarms, Big Threat Keep U.S. Air 
Defenses Busy,” The Washington Post, 30 October 2001, 1.   
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Figure 4.   CONR’s Alert Bases on 11 September 200153 
B. CONCLUSION 
Operation Noble Eagle is a “steady state NORAD mission” according to Col Herb 
Brown the from the U.S. Air Force Homeland Defense office in the Pentagon.54  It is 
clear from this short review of the history of air defense in America that our past has been 
anything but “steady state” when it comes to this unique and important mission.   
We have seen the rise and fall of air defense in America over the last 68 years. 
The mission has evolved and changed along with the threats to our nation, the political 
will of our leadership, and funding.  We have seen air defense grow from a concept on 
paper in 1940 to four numbered air forces by 1942 and then back to a single headquarters 
organization with no assigned aircraft or pilots by 1946.  Air defense grew again in the 
1950s to over 2000 assigned aircraft (1500 interceptors/fighters) to counter the Soviet 
bomber threat.  Conventional air defense then shrunk back down to only fourteen fighters 
sitting on alert to help fight the “War on Drugs” by September 2001.   
Change is inevitable.  The next chapter will analyze NORAD’s performance on 
9/11 and chronicle the evolution of Operation Noble Eagle over the last seven years.   
                                                 
53 CONAR, “Operation Noble Eagle,” Briefing from First Air Force, CONUS NORAD Region, 
Tyndall AFB, FL.  
54 Herb Brown, Col, USAF, “USAF Support to Homeland Defense and Civil Support” presentation 
given to the Homeland Security students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. (5 February 
2008). 
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III. U.S. AIR DEFENSE AFTER SEPTEMBER 2001 
A. NORAD’S FAILURES ON 9/11 
NORAD is a bi-national (United States and Canadian) organization charged with 
providing aerospace warning and control for North America.  Aerospace warning 
includes the monitoring and alert of attack against North America by aircraft, missiles, or 
space vehicles.   Aerospace control ensures air sovereignty and air defense of Canada and 
the United States.55   
On the morning of 11 September 2001, nineteen al-Qaida terrorists successfully 
hijacked four fully fueled U.S. transcontinental airliners and turned them into cruise 
missiles.  They successfully carried out a masterfully simple yet effective surprise attack 
on America and caught our nation’s air defense forces completely off guard.   
According to Gen Ralph Eberhart, the Commander of NORAD on 9/11 “our air 
defense posture was aligned to ‘look outward’ to counter external threats to North 
America.”56  In accordance with DoD directives in effect on 9/11, NORAD was required 
to monitor and report the actions of any hijacked aircraft if requested by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA).  DoD’s role was simply to support the civilian agencies 
in the event of a hijacking.  Eberhart said, “we had procedures for potential hijackings, 
which were based on the premise that hijacked aircraft would be used for ransom or 
political purposes, not as a weapon.”57 
The biggest issue for NORAD was the sheer size of the area they were assigned to 
defend with only fourteen aircraft spread out around the country.  The Northeastern 
United States was protected by four alert fighters at two bases on September 2001.  
NORAD had two alert fighters at Otis AFB in Cape Cod, MA and another two at Langley 
                                                 
55 About NORAD, http://www.norad.mil/about/index.html (accessed 9 May 08). 
56 Statement before the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the U.S., 17 June 2004,  
http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/eberhart_statement.pdf (accessed 9 May 08).   
57 Statement before the National Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the U.S., 17 June 2004,  
http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing12/eberhart_statement.pdf (accessed 9 May 08).   
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AFB in Hampton, VA.  These aircraft were controlled by the North East Air Defense 
Sector (NEADS) headquartered in Rome, NY.  NEADS had an area of responsibility 
(AOR) covering over one million square miles.58  
 
Figure 5.   NEADS Reporting Structure on 9/1159 
In 2001, like NORAD, NEADS was still focused outward, looking Cold War era 
bomber attacks and drug runners.  NORAD and NEADS had become a bit complacent 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and their focus was on the wrong threat, even though al-
Qaida terrorist threats were well known in the 1990s and intelligence estimates discussed 
the possibility of hijacked aircraft being used as cruise missiles.60   
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59 “9/11 Commission Staff Statement,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, 21 August 2004, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch1.htm (accessed 16 
September 2008). 
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Figure 6.   CONR’s Sensors on 11 September 200161 
Al-Qaida’s attack took advantage of the poor security measures and the massive 
amount of lightly defended airspace.  They had countless targets of opportunity in the 
densely populated cities throughout the North East and chose to split their attacks 
between New York and Washington D.C., making it more difficult for NORAD to 
anticipate their next move.   
Al-Qaida also chose to execute their attack in a very dense air traffic area.  There 
were more than 4,000 aircraft airborne over the U.S. on the morning of 9/11 and more 
than 1,000 of them were in the Northeast.62  This made it more difficult for NORAD’s 
antiquated air defense systems to find and track the hijacked aircraft amongst all the other 
air traffic (see Figure 7).  The hijackers further complicated the situation for NORAD and 
the FAA by turning off the transponder beacons on the hijacked aircraft and descending 
below reliable radar coverage.63 
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Figure 7.   Aircraft aloft on morning of 11 September 200164 
At 08:14 on the morning of 9/11, an Egyptian and four Saudis hijacked American 
Airlines Flight 11 (AA-11).  Boston air traffic control center finally notified NEADS of 
the hijacking at 08:32 and requested “military assistance” in the vicinity of New York 
City.65  NEADS delayed the scramble while trying to locate AA-11 on their radar scopes.  
They finally gave the order to launch the two F-15 Eagles from Cape Cod, MA (Otis 
AFB) to a point over Manhattan at 08:45.  At 08:46:40, AA-11 hit the north tower of the 
World Trade Center (WTC).66  The Otis AFB, Eagles were in the air by 08:53 and 
inbound to New York City when United Airlines Flight 175 hit the south tower of the 
WTC at 09:03:11.67 
Cape Cod, MA is approximately 200 miles from New York City and Hampton, 
VA is about 130 miles from Washington DC.  Even at top speed, it would have taken the 
fighters 20-30 minutes from the scramble order to get into an effective defensive position 
near the intended target areas.   
                                                 






The lack of prior planning for such an attack, poor equipment, poor 
communication, and poor coordination within and among all federal agencies continued 
to compound the confusion and hampered the efforts for the rest of that fateful day.   
At 09:21, Boston Center saw a false radar track on their radar scope heading south 
from New York City towards Washington D.C. and advised NEADS that AA-11 was still 
airborne and heading toward the capital.  NEADS scrambled the two F-16 Falcons from 
Langley AFB at 09:24 to fly to D.C. and search for the American Airlines flight.  
Unfortunately, the mission instructions were not clearly communicated to the fighter 
pilots before takeoff, and NEADS could not establish direct radio contact with the jets 
because they were too low and too far away.68  The F-16s were in the air by 09:34 but the 
pilots followed their normal training flight plan out over the Atlantic Ocean to set up 
defensive CAPs approximately 60 miles off the east coast – “a plan dating from the Cold 
War.”69  One of the pilots later told the 9/11 commission that he “reverted to the Russian 
threat – I was thinking it was a cruise-missile attack from the ocean.”70  
Meanwhile, American Airlines Flight 77 (AA-77) had taken off from Dulles 
Airport at 08:20.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) informed NEADS that 
flight was “missing” at 09:34.  AA-77 crashed into the Pentagon at 09:37:46 while the F-
16s were over 150 miles away and going the wrong direction.71  It was almost 10:00 by 
the time NEADS finally got control of the F-16s and vectored them into a defensive CAP 
over the National Capital Region (NCR).72 
United Airlines Flight 93 (UA-93) took off from Newark, NJ at 08:42.  The FAA 
was aware this jet was hijacked at 09:34 but did not inform NEADS until 10:07.  10:07 
was about ten minutes after the passengers of UA-93 had revolted against the terrorists 
and four minutes after the plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, PA (at 10:03).73  
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Even if the fighters had been on station in the CAP over Washington D.C., they 
did not have authority to shoot the airliners down under the standing peace-time rules of 
engagement (ROE).  That authority needed to come from the President but actually came 
first from the Vice President in the White House bunker at 10:19.74  The shoot-down 
order was passed from the White House to the NORAD command center in Cheyenne 
Mountain, Colorado and then forwarded to the Continental United States NORAD 
Region (CONR) at Tyndall AFB, FL.  Major General Larry Arnold was the ANG’s 
commander of 1st Air Force and CONR at the time.  He was responsible for the 
command, control, and communication (C3) of the air defense fighter forces around the 
country.  He instructed his staff to broadcast the following message to NEADS over the 
command’s instant messaging “chat” system: “10:31, Vice President has cleared us to 
intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per General 
Arnold.”75 The instant message confused the controllers at NEADS and they failed to 
clarify or pass the order on to the pilots in the CAPs because “they were unsure how the 
pilots would, or should, proceed with this guidance.”76 In short, while the national 
leadership in Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to 
“take out” the hijacked airliners, the only order actually conveyed to the pilots by 
NEADS was to “ID type and tail” which is standard ROE for peacetime operations.77   
It is very doubtful that the F-16s in the CAP over Washington D.C. would have 
been able to stop UA-93 had it continued toward the capital.  The hijackers had turned 
the aircraft transponder off and NEADS did not find out about the hijacking of UA-93 
until 10:07.   The hijacked aircraft would have arrived over D.C. at approximately 
10:23.78  The shoot down authority was not transmitted to NEADS until 10:31, almost an 
hour and forty-four minutes after the first plane hit the World Trade Center.   





78 9/11 Commission Staff Statement. 
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The 9/11 Commission later accused Major General Arnold of deliberately making 
false statements in the aftermath of 9/11 to “obscure the mistakes on the part of the 
military and to overstate the readiness of the military (NORAD) to intercept and, if 
necessary, shoot down UA-93.”79  The Pentagon’s inspector general’s office investigated 
the accusations in 2004 but the results were not released and are still “classified.”80 
The surprise and unpredictability of the 9/11 attacks kept our air defense forces 
reeling.  It is clear that NORAD lacked sufficient planning, training, and forces to 
effectively defend their assigned area of responsibility.  Four fighters on alert at only two 
bases in the Northeast, along with the poor C3 and coupled with fifty years of training for 
a high altitude bomber and cruise missile attacks from the ocean made it very difficult for 
NORAD to flex their operations real time to deal with a surprise asymmetric terrorist 
attack from within the U.S. borders.  NORADs lack of situational awareness (SA) 
prevented our air defense system from being able to intercept and prevent any of the 9/11 
attacks.   
NORAD also lacked additional armed fighters in reserve or air refueling tankers 
on alert to help keep the fighters airborne in the CAPs.  A third ‘spare’ jet configured for 
training took off from the alert site at Langley AFB, VA for D.C. but it was unarmed and 
lacked sufficient fuel to remain on station.81  NORAD did not have any contingency 
plans in place for additional aircraft support.  It took several hours after the attack to 
coordinate with other ANG and active duty fighter squadrons along with air refueling 
tankers and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) bases to organize the 
necessary combat power.  Dozens of squadrons around the country eventually armed 










The fighters flew 24 hour-a-day defensive air patrols over New York City, Washington, 
D.C. and many other major American cities for the next six months.83  NORAD’s post 
9/11 effort was the birth of the Operation Noble Eagle that still continues today.   
B. THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE 
The military insisted on helping to protect the centers of “American political, 
governmental, and economic activity” in New York City and Washington D.C. 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks with 24 hour CAPs.84  It was critical that NORAD not 
make the same mistakes again so additional random CAPs were flown over other cities 
and critical infrastructure around the country.  President George W. Bush authorized the 
mobilization of thousands of ANG and reservists immediately after 9/11 for homeland 
defense and civil support in response to the terrorist attacks.  This mission was called 
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) and was intended to be an emergency stop-gap air defense 
measure “anchored by combat air patrols.”85    There were up to 130 fighters, 75 tankers, 
and 15 E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the air over 
America every day supporting as many as 30 CAPs.86 Each aircraft flew four-to-six hour 
sorties.87  By mid-December 2001, the Air Force was spending over $200 million a 
month and had flown over 10,000 sorties in support of the domestic air defense 
operation.88  The USAF’s homeland effort had “eclipsed the number of sorties flown in 
support of the war in Afghanistan.”89  By March 2002, NORAD and the ANG’s 1st Air 
Force had reactivated more than 30 former Cold War alert bases around the country.90  
The active duty Air Force had consumed its entire annual flying hour budget half way 
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through the fiscal year supporting the CAPs.91  Pilot’s combat proficiency was beginning 
to deteriorate as training tapered off and the service was burning up its supply of spare 
parts while jets were “stacked up in depot maintenance” for required inspections and 
overhauls.92  
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was formed in October 2002 to 
consolidate command and control of DoD’s homeland defense and civil support efforts.93 
USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) “includes air, land and sea approaches 
and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the 
surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles.”94 The commander of 
USNORTHCOM is also ‘dual-hated’ as the commander of NORAD.  He is primarily 
responsible for Operation Noble Eagle and its impact on the Air Force.  
It became clear to USNORTHCOM and Air Force leadership that the global war 
on terrorism would be a long fight at home and abroad.  The nonstop Noble Eagle CAPs 
were putting a “major strain on pilots, aircraft, maintainers, and the military budget.”95 
Some early funding for ONE came from supplemental “war on terror” accounts but that 
money eventually dried up and the missions started to be funded from the normal USAF 
operations and maintenance (O&M) budget.96  The Air Force began to look for more 
“cost-effective ways to defend America and settled on a plan based on increased air 
sovereignty alert (ASA), supplemented by random and ‘threat-based’ air patrols” along 
with improved surveillance and command, control, communication capability (C3).97  
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1. ONE Air Sovereignty Alert 
NORAD eventually settled for 18 steady-state ANG alert sites around the 
country.98  They keep a minimum of 32 fighters (plus 16 spare jets), along with eight 
refueling tankers, and two AWACS aircraft on constant alert.99  These alert jets can be in 
the air in as little as five minutes depending on the threat level and air sovereignty alert 
posture.  The ONE mission has been popular with ANG squadrons who were in jeopardy 
of being closed down by the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC).  The 
ANG saw a significant reduction in their air defense mission and funding in the 1990s. 
After 9/11, they realized they could contribute to the new homeland security mission and 
have seen significant increases in their budgets and personnel.  “Compared to mid-2001, 
the ANG has more than five times as many airmen devoted to the alert mission.”100   
The 121st Fighter Squadron (FS) at Andrews AFB, MD is a good example of the 
expanded role and increase in personnel for the ANG since 9/11.  The squadron has about 
32 pilots.  Before 9/11, 26 of them were traditional, part-time “drilling” Guardsmen with 
only six full-time pilot slots.101  The ratio has reversed as the squadron’s increased 
budget authorization allows them to have 25 full-time pilots on the payroll.102  The ‘new’ 
mission has helped many pilots and crews who were furloughed from their airlines jobs 
after 9/11 or those who just wanted to take a leave of absence from their civilian jobs to 
come back in the Air Force.  The pay, stability, and benefits (including retirement) for 
full-time Guard alert personnel is very appealing.   
The ANG is using the additional funding and political support to increase the 
number of primary assigned aircraft (PAA), hire more support airmen, and upgrade their 
aircraft with new equipment.  Many of the ANG alert squadrons have gone from 15 to 18 
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PAA while some of the recent upgrades for their fighters have included the new AIM-9X 
Sidewinder missile, the Joint Helmet Sighting System (JHMCS), Tactical Data Link 
(Link 16), and Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars.   
NORAD’s alert fighters have received over 2000 scramble orders since 9/11 in 
response to targets of interest (TOI) around the country.103  The majority of these 
scrambles were simply for general aviation pilots who were off course, on the wrong 
radio frequency, squawking the wrong transponder code, or did not file a proper flight 
plan.104  Most of the incidents specifically in the Washington D.C. area were resolved 
before the fighters got airborne and resulted in only a handful of actual intercepts.105   
2. ONE Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) 
This research has not uncovered any stories since 9/11 of airborne TOIs that have 
actually been threats to the NCR or anywhere else in the country requiring an ‘armed’ 
fighter aircraft response.  Despite all the ‘false alarms,’ the alert fighters do serve an 
important role in our nation’s security and defense.  However, Noble Eagle’s combat air 
patrols are simply used as a show of force to deter another 9/11-type attack.  NORAD 
schedules these “random” air defense deterrence missions over major U.S. population 
centers, nuclear and chemical sites, and pre-planned national events.   
The ANG had over 640 fighter/attack aircraft (~32% of the Air Force’s fleet) in 
2001.106  “To prevent the mission from becoming a total Air Guard burden,” the active 
duty USAF aircraft helps fly the combat air patrols requiring a “known commitment.”107  
The known commitments are referred by NORAD as National Special Security Events 
(NSSE).  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sets temporary flight restricted 
zones around these NSSEs that keep unauthorized aircraft anywhere from three to 30 
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miles away (see Figure 8). The NSSEs include President of the United States (POTUS) 
movements, political gatherings like the Democratic National Convention, large sporting 
events such as the Super Bowl, and other occasions that attract widespread attention, for 
example, space shuttle launches.108    
 
Figure 8.   Cape Canaveral Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR).109 
In August 2007, the Air National Guard-led 1st Air Force, in its U.S. Continental 
NORAD Region role tasked two active duty fighter wings for one of the many and varied 
annual NSSEs.  The 33rd Fighter Wing (FW) at Eglin AFB, Florida, and the 388th FW at 
Hill AFB, Utah were assigned the mission of patrolling central Florida with their F-15s 
and F-16s in preparation for the space shuttle launch on mission STS-118.110  The 
Wing’s deployed jets, pilots, support personnel, and equipment at a significant cost to 
support the mission.  The fighters were tasked to “make low passes over the area tourist 
attractions, airports, and the Kennedy Space Center.”111 Additional low passes were 
flown over Disney World, Universal Studios Orlando, and Daytona Beach International 
                                                 
108 Adam J. Hebert, “Homeland Defense,” Air Force Magazine, November 2001, 
www.afa.org/magazine/nov2001/1101homeland.asp (accessed 2 November 2007). 
109 NORCOM, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM Support Space Shuttle Launch,” 
http://www.northcom.mil/News/2008/111008.html (accessed 2 November 2008).  
110 AFA, “Noble Eagle Ramps Up for Shuttle,” airforce-magazine.com, http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2007/August%202007/August%2003%202007/1030noble.aspx (accessed 
14 October 2008).  
111 Ibid. 
 27
Speedway with air-refueling support provided by KC-135 Stratotankers from the 186th 
Air Refueling Wing in Meridian, Mississippi.112  ANG Maj. Gen. Hank Morrow, the 1st 
AF Commander said “there’s been no specific threat but Americans should view the air 
defense deterrence measures.”113  
It is difficult to understand how costly “saber rattling” air patrol missions like 
these can be justified without any credible intelligence about a specific airborne threat.114  
Especially in light of rising fuel costs, shrinking budgets, low active-duty pilot experience 
rates, high operations tempos, and endless overseas deployments in support of operations 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.   
 
Figure 9.   An F-15C in a CAP over the space shuttle.115 
3. ONE Command, Control, and Communications (C3) 
The Operation Noble Eagle alert and CAP missions are tasked and controlled by 
NORAD/USNORTHCOM’s 1AF located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. The Air National 
Guard commanded 1AF is also known as Air Forces Northern or AFNORTH for short.  
AFNORTH has a complicated command structure. They are the air component for 
USNORTHCOM and have the responsibility to command and employ aerospace power 
                                                 
112 388th FW, “CONR Fighters Patrolling Central Florida,” 388th Fighter Wing, 
http://www.388fw.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123063154  (accessed 14 October 2008).  
113 Ibid. 
114 No credible open source intelligence indicating a threat to aviation requiring a fighter response has 
been found during this research.  Intelligence reports reference threats in generic and vague terms.   
115 Google Pictures, www.strategypage.com/.../cap_over_shuttle_1.jpg (accessed 1 November 2008).  
 28
within NORAD’s CONR region.116  1AF is also one of the USAF Air Combat 
Command’s (ACC) five numbered Air Forces.117 ACC is responsible to organize, train, 
and equip units for the air defense and air sovereignty mission while the National Guard 
Bureau (NGB) is responsible for ensuring that 1AF is properly organized, trained, and 
resourced with military personnel and funding.118 
The ANG and active duty relationship is “further complicated by the fact that 
most of 1AF’s approximately 390 headquarters staff (up from 165 personnel in 2001) and 
over 2,300 support personnel are Guardsmen who remain in state status” (Title 32, U.S. 
Code) while performing their normal duties.119 The air defense and air sovereignty 
mission is a federal responsibility so Guardsmen are “automatically converted to federal 
status (Title 10, U.S. Code) when actually conducting intercepts of unidentified aircraft in 
U.S. air space.”120 
The Operation Noble Eagle missions are planned and directed for CONR’s two 
air defense sectors by AFNORTH/1AF’s 601st Air and Space Operation Center (AOC).  
The AOC operates from their new 37,000 square foot, $30 million facility.121  The 
operations center began functioning in November 2006 at Tyndall AFB, FL when the 
Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS) shut down.122  SEADS handed its air defense and 
sovereignty mission over to the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS).  NEADS is 
located in Rome, NY and now has responsibility for all alert and CAP missions east of 
the Mississippi River including the National Capital Region.  NEADS was unofficially 
redesigned as the Eastern Air Defense Sector (EADS).    
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The Western Air Defense Sector (WADS) is located at McCord AFB, 
Washington and is staffed primarily by members of the Washington Air National 
Guard.123 WADS is responsible for the security and integrity for approximately 1.9 
million square miles of continental U.S. airspace west of the Mississippi River.124    
Both WADS and EADS monitor their assigned airspace through an extensive 
network of radars and radios located thought the United States.  The network is known as 
the Joint Surveillance System and has been a significant improvement over pre-9/11 
capabilities.  It is jointly funded program that is maintained by FAA personnel but used 
by both the DoD and the FAA.  The sectors also use radar information from tethered 
aerostat balloons and “gap filler radars to improve low level coverage” along our 
southern borders.125  The “radar data from all these sources is electronically fed into 
computers at the respective Sector Operations Control Centers where personnel correlate 
and identify all airborne targets and, if necessary, scramble alert fighters” or commit 
fighters from airborne CAPs to identify unknown or threatening TOIs.126 
 
Figure 10.   NORAD’s Improved Joint Surveillance System127 
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The 601st AOC generates a daily Air Tasking Order (ATO) based on higher 
headquarter requirements along with standard ONE alert commitments.  The ATO 
assigns alert and CAP missions to ANG and active duty Air Force squadrons around the 
country.  The AOC sends the ATO to EADS and WADS who in turn breakout the 
specific missions and forward the information to the tasked units for execution.  EADS 
and WADS are the command and control agencies responsible for scrambling fighters, 
managing the daily CAPs, as well as relaying mission information back to the AOC.  The 
AOC then passes the pertinent details to NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, CO 
and coordinates future taskings. The AOC also tasks the 121st FS from Andrews AFB for 
their alert commitment in Washington D.C. and schedules CAPs as required for the 
National Capital Region (NCR). 
4. National Capital Region  
The Joint Forces Headquarters National Capital Region in Ft. McNair, 
Washington, D.C. has a two star U.S. Army general in charge and is a subordinate 
command of USNORTHCOM.  They coordinate with all DoD services to help protect 
our nations “political and military center of gravity.”128  
The NCR uses a unique integrated air defense system (IADS) with both surface to 
air missiles (SAMs) and fighter aircraft.  The fighters are controlled by NORAD’s 
Eastern Air Defense Sector while the SAMs are operated by the U.S. Army National 
Guard in coordination with NORAD.   
The region also uses a ground-based laser visual warning system to alert 
unauthorized pilots who have flown into restricted airspace over the nation’s capital.129  
The alternating green and red eye-safe laser lights were developed in 2005 by the Air 
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Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office.130  NORAD wanted a more cost effective alternative 
to alert general aviation pilots of their airspace violations instead of scrambling alert 
fighters to intercept the unauthorized aircraft.   
The scrambled fighters cost the USAF a lot of time and money.  The jets are 
required to intercept and drop flares in front of the stray aircraft to let them know they 
have entered the Washington D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) without 
authorization.  The ADIZ extends for 30 miles around the Washington Monument and up 
to 18,000 feet (see Figure 11).131  
 
Figure 11.   Washington D.C. ADIZ132 
The Army National Guard has command and control over the NCR’s ground 
based air defense systems.  The mission is called Operation Clear Skies and has evolved 
into a complex network of offensive and defensive military and civil assets.  Some of the 
equipment added since 9/11 including additional ground based Sentinel 3D phased array 
radar systems, heat seeking Stinger missiles, and the Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air 
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Missile (NASAM) system employing the U.S. made AIM-120 Advanced Medium 
Ranged Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).133  These systems will be covered in more 
detail in Chapter VI.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The 9/11 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States cited 
the “failure of imagination” on the part of U.S. officials that contributed the nation 
vulnerability to attack.134  It is clear now that NORAD made mistakes on 9/11 but their 
real failure occurred during the budget battles of 1990’s when they persisted in focusing 
their limited air defense efforts on external Soviet-style bomber attacks.  The Berlin Wall 
fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.  NORAD’s “failure of imagination” 
in the 10-12 years that preceded the 9/11 attacks was the root cause for their mistakes on 
that day.  NORAD’s failure to anticipate realistic current and future threats contributed to 
their inability to respond effectively to the hijacked aircraft once they were turned into 
attack missiles.  This “new” threat contained over 10,000 gallons of jet fuel and was 
employed by a known terrorist organization.  
NORAD does not want to make the same mistakes again and has invested billions 
of dollars and countless hours in improving the nation’s air defense system.  They 
increased the number of alert fighters, added airborne combat air patrols, significantly 
improving their command and control system, and took drastic steps to protect our 
nation’s capital with an integrated air defense system.  NORAD must be careful to not 
focus too much of their efforts on deterring another attack employing hijacked aircraft. 
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capability for our aircrews while the utility of these CAPs and their effectiveness is 
questionable given the lack of actionable intelligence and the improvements in aviation 
security.   
The next chapter will evaluate the threats to aviation in America and review the 
security improvements made to minimize the risk of another 9/11.  
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IV. PROTECTING THE U.S. AVIATION INDUSTRY POST 9/11  
A. THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON AIR TRAVEL 
Over 600 million people fly on our nation’s airlines each year.135  The 9/11 
attacks hit the airline industry harder than any other critical industry in the United States.  
“Security Control of Air Traffic and Navigational Aids” (SCATANA) was declared for 
the first time in the nation’s history, and our entire airspace system was shutdown.  
Hundreds of aircraft taxiing for takeoff were ordered back to the terminals at over 450 
airports around the country.136  By 9:25 am on that fateful morning, 4,452 airborne 
airplanes were directed to land at the nearest airports and no international flights were 
allowed to enter U.S. airspace.137  Armed military fighter jets roamed freely in the skies 
over the country for four days as our nation’s airspace remained closed.   
The forced shutdown severely impacted an airline industry that was already 
struggling financially.  The industry saw a drastic reduction in passenger loads (demand) 
after 9/11 causing a number of companies to go out of business or declared bankruptcy.  
Almost 160,000 employees were laid off or furloughed and the airlines mothballed 
almost 1,000 airplanes in the Arizona desert.138  The airlines lost an estimated $1.4 
billion during the four-day airspace shutdown and hemorrhaged an estimated $40 billion 
by 2006.139   
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The federal government immediately offered $5 billion in grants and $10 billion 
in loan guarantees to the airlines to help cover their losses as a result of the terrorist 
attacks.140  This was just a short-term fix.  More was needed to improve safety and 
restore the confidence of the flying public.   
Significant measures were taken to overhaul our nation’s intelligence community 
(IC) and aviation security.  Twenty layers of security were added to protect our air 
transportation system from terrorists (see Figure 12).  This chapter will review key 
intelligence and security improvements and offer a risk assessment of the chance of 
another aircraft hijacking of a kind that would call for an armed fighter response.  The 
chapter will not address the risk of having an airliner blown up or shot down because 
Operation Noble Eagle and armed fighters do little to mitigate those threats. 
 
Figure 12.   “20 Layers of Security”141 
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B. CHANGES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC) 
The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 “signaled the rise of a new kind of 
terrorism, not sponsored by any state, not directed toward any particular political end, but 
intended just to kill as many Americans as possible.”142  The attacks on 9/11 made 
counter-terrorism and the protection of our nation the number one issue for our 
government.  The IC shouldered much of the blame for the failure to predict and prevent 
the 9/11 attacks.  The Bush administration and Congress were determined to overhaul the 
numerous stove-piped intelligence organizations in America.   
The first major step toward reform occurred when Congress passed the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.  The IRTPA created 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) where law enforcement and intelligence 
personnel work side by side in the same headquarters.  The IRTPA also created the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).  The Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the IC to ensure close coordination and 
integration of the 16 main governmental intelligence agencies and other intelligence 
components responsible for “foreign, military and domestic intelligence in defense of the 
homeland and of United States interests abroad.”143  The DNI also acts as the “principal 
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security 
Council for intelligence.”144 The ODNI published the first ever National Intelligence 
Strategy in 2005 that set into motion a mindset shift in the IC from the traditional 
principle of “need to know” and stove piped secrecy to a “need to share.”145 
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In April 2007, Mike McConnell, the DNI, announced a 100 Day Plan for 
Integration and Collaboration.  The plan laid out “specific, measurable short-term goals” 
and created the “momentum to transform into a truly integrated community” that can use 
“all available national resources in a single, coordinated fashion.” 146 The plan identified 
six key areas for focus and improvement: 1.) Create a culture of collaboration 2.) Foster 
collection and analytic transformation 3.) Build technology leadership and acquisition 
excellence 4.) Modernize business practices 5.) Accelerate information sharing and 
finally, 6.) Clarify and align the DNI’s authority and leadership roles and 
responsibilities.147 
In September of 2007, the DNI released an updated report on the progress of the 
“100 Day Plan.”148  Successes included the implementation of a civilian joint duty 
program similar to the DoD’s Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  
Equal employment opportunity and diversity have been improved in the IC in an effort to 
“recruit, hire and retain first-and second-generation Americans with critically needed 
language skills and unique cultural backgrounds.”149 The security clearance process and 
information sharing have been improved by “standardizing identity and access policies 
across agencies, networks, and systems.”150 Finally, the DNI instituted an IC-wide 
leadership forum and executive committee to help “resolve issues quickly and effectively 
with the heads of other U.S. intelligence agencies.”151 
The ODNI has made significant improvements in the IC but there is still a lot to 
do so they now have a “500 Day Plan” to continue the efforts to help break down the 
stove pipes and build on their integration and collaboration successes.   
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C. IMPROVEMENTS IN AIRLINE SECURITY 
A 2004 RAND study concluded that the most likely terrorist attacks will be 
bombing “soft targets.”152  Meanwhile, the federal government has taken drastic and 
costly steps to “harden” the civilian airline industry and improve security in an effort to 
minimize the chance of another hijacking in America.   
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) were both formed after 9/11 in the largest reorganization of the 
federal government since the creation of the Defense Department in 1947.  TSA has the 
critical responsibility for protecting the nation’s transportation system.153  The agency 
was established in November 2001 with the passage of the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act.  TSA employs a workforce of approximately 50,000, including passenger 
and baggage screeners.154 Their security officers operate at over 450 airports, 700 
security checkpoints, and nearly 7,000 baggage screening areas.155 The standardized 
checkpoints in the airports are the most visible action taken since 9/11 but they are only 
one measure in the many layers of defense designed to deter and prevent a terrorist from 
hijacking an airliner.   
Other critical layers of the defense addressed in this chapter include the Federal 
Air Marshal Service (FAMS), reinforced cockpit doors, armed pilots (the Federal Flight 
Deck Officer (FFDO) program), the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP), more 
stringent visitor and student visa requirements (U.S. VISIT), passenger watch lists 
including the international screening under the Advance Passenger Information System 
(APIS) as well as domestic screening with the “Secure Flight” program. The final, and 
probably most effective layer of defense is a more aware and less tolerant flying public.   
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1. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) 
The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) had 33 agents on 9/11.156  There are 
now approximately 6,000 full-time agents (the exact numbers are classified) while the 
federal government plans to spend $663 million on the program in 2009.157   The air 
marshals are placed on aircraft to “detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air 
carriers, airports, passengers, and crews.”158  According to TSA, air marshals fly on at 
about 5% the 28,000 daily commercial flights in America.159  Air marshals are highly 
trained in close quarter firearms employment and hand-to-hand combat.  The FAMS 
agents pass on their training and knowledge to other federal, state, and local law 
enforcement officers who want to carry an accessible weapon on flights in America.  
They also train airline employees under the Crew Member Self-Defense and Federal 
Flight Deck Officer training programs.160   
2. Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) and Hardened Cockpit Doors 
Many airline pilots are now armed under the Federal Flight Deck Officer 
program.161 This program allows pilots and flight engineers to carry and “use firearms to 
defend against an act of criminal violence or air piracy attempting to gain control of an 
aircraft.”162  The FFDOs are trained by FAMS agents on the use of force, firearms, 
defensive tactics, and the legal issues associated with the program.163  Also, the FAA and 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) now require reinforced cockpit 
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doors on any airplane in the world with more than twenty seats.  The doors are designed 
and built to “protect cockpits from forced intrusion, small-arms fire, and fragmentation 
devices (grenades).”164  The FAA is evaluating the installation of video monitoring 
systems in the back of airliners so pilots can see what is going on in the cabin as well as 
installing aircraft transponders that operate continuously.165   
3. Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) 
Almost 8,000 foreign students receive flight training in the U.S. every year.166 All 
the terrorist pilots that participated in the 9/11 attacks, including the “ringleader,” 
Mohamed Atta received their flight training in the U.S. without background checks, and 
possessed improper student visas.167 The Vision 100 – Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act, 2003 mandated that DHS screen and track all foreign flight students 
in the U.S. under the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP).168 The goal of the program is 
to ensure foreign flight students in the America do not present a threat to the aviation 
community or national security.  The TSA run program has an operating budget of almost 
$12 million per year.169 Applications for international students are easily accessed 
electronically on the AFSP webpage.  AFSP requires all foreign flight students submit 
personal background information, photos, fingerprints, and a $130 application fee to TSA 
for review and adjudication prior to beginning initial flight training at any of the 393 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified flight schools.170   
                                                 
164 FAA, “Fact Sheet, Aircraft Security Accomplishment Since Sept. 11 (September 2002).” 
http://www.faa.gov/newsroom/factsheets/2002/factsheets_020905.htm (accessed 29 August 2008).  
165 Ibid. 
166 Brian Ross, Vic Walter and Eric Longabardi, “9/11 Redux: ‘Thousands of Aliens’ in U.S. flight 
Schools Illegally,” ABC NEWS, (27 February 2008) 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4353991&page=1 (accessed 2 March 2008). 
167 “9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” A staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (Franklin, Tennessee: Hillsboro Press, 2004), 8. 
168 TSA, “Alien Flight Student Program,” TSA, Department of Homeland Security, 
https://www.flightschoolcandidates.gov/afsp2/afspindex.py?acct_type=c&section=LI 
(accessed 2 March 2008). 
169 Ibid. 
170 TSA, AFSP. 
 42
The flight schools are required collect, verify, and maintain 12 different forms of 
identification and documentation once the student arrives for training including copies of 
the student’s passport and visa.171  The schools must also send a current photograph of 
the student, along with fingerprints, to TSA to verify that the individual showing up for 
training is in fact the same person who initially applied for the AFSP.  Flight schools are 
also required to notify authorities if the students do not show up for training.172  TSA and 
FAA inspectors visit flight schools periodically to ensure they are in compliance of the 
new security measures.  An example of the effectiveness of this programmed occurred in 
August 2006 when the FBI launched a successful nationwide manhunt to track down 
several Egyptian flight students who failed to show up for flight training after entering 
the country.173 
4. Visa Screening and U.S.-VISIT Tracking Programs 
Prior to 9/11 there were serious problems with the way U.S. visitor and student 
visas were issued by the Department of State while the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) did not have an ability to effectively track a visitor’s entry and exit. 
Nineteen of the September 11th hijackers applied for 23 visas and obtained 22.174 Most of 
the visas were obtained with new passports to mask the applicants travel history and all 
applications were incomplete or fraudulent.175 Only two of the 19 applicants were 
personally interviewed by a U.S. Department of State consular officer before being issued 
a visa.176  At least six of the 9/11 hijackers overstayed their visas in violation of U.S. 
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immigration law.177  Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the attack, persuaded an INS 
inspector to let him reentered the U.S. in January 2001 to continue his flight training 
without a student visa.178  Atta had overstayed his tourist visa on a previous visit to 
America, but there was no effective national tracking system in place at the time to match 
his previous immigration law violation.179  The Department of State and DHS have 
improved the visa screening and visitor tracking process since 9/11.  
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 directed the 
Department of State to implement new, more stringent visa application procedures.  Two 
of the most important mandates were machine-readable, tamper resistant entry and exit 
documents that use biometric identifiers as well as additional training for U.S. embassy 
consular officers to help spot applicants that may pose a threat.  The Visa Screening 
Officers (VSO) program was created to improve the visa issuing process.180  VSOs are 
deployed to embassies around the world, and given additional training in languages, fraud 
detection, and interview techniques.181    
DHS has also undertaken a multi-billion dollar effort to screen and track the entry 
and exit of every visitor to the U.S. under the U.S.-VISIT program.182 The program 
interfaces with over twenty existing systems and has uses the motto: “Keeping America’s 
Doors Open and Our Nation Secure.”183 U.S.-VISIT is part of the layered security plan 
that starts overseas where visa applicants provide biometrics (digital finger print scans 
and photographs) to the U.S. consular offices issuing the visas.  Applicants are checked 
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against a database of suspected terrorists and known criminals.184 The visitor’s 
biometrics are then verified at the port of entry to ensure the person trying to enter the 
U.S. is in fact the same person who was issued the visa.185 The U.S.-VISIT biometric 
entry system is now in place at 116 airports, 15 seaports and 154 land ports of entry in the 
United States.186  
Airlines will be required to start collecting the biometric data of foreign visitors 
leaving the country when they check-in for their departure flight at the airport.187  The 
airlines will pass this information on to DHS.  Visitors who fail to depart the country on 
time will have their visas automatically voided and authorities at immigration 
enforcement will be notified.  DHS plans to have the program up and running by the end 
of 2008 in an effort to crack down on visa overstays in compliance with the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Enhanced Border Security Act of 2002.188   
5. Passenger Watch Lists 
On August 9, 2007, DHS announced that it was taking over the responsibility 
from the airlines for checking domestic and international passenger information against 
government watch lists.189  “Previous attempts by the DHS to take over this function 
from airlines have failed amid objections from privacy advocates” but the lack of 
procedural consistency on the part of the carriers has forced DHS to finally act.190  TSA 
receives passenger manifest information as early as 72 hours but no later than 30 minutes 
before a scheduled departure.  They will notify the airlines and local security if any of the 
passengers are known or suspected terrorists in an effort to prevent them from boarding 
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an aircraft.191  TSA may also identify individuals for enhanced screening.192  This 
program will “strengthen aviation security through uniformed and consistent passenger 
pre-screening and facilitate legitimate passenger air travel.”193 
 
Figure 13.   Secure Flight Process194 
6. Public Awareness 
Finally, “passengers would never allow four or five lightly armed hijackers to 
take over an airplane…not after 9/11….they would beat them to within an inch of their 
lives”.195  One of the reasons for the losses we suffered on 9/11 was the hesitation of the 
crew and passengers on the hijacked flights to confront the hijackers because “most 
previous hijackings ended peacefully or with minimal loss of life.”196 Crews were trained 
in the concept of passive resistance because no one had been killed during a hijacking in 
                                                 
191 TSA, “Secure Flight Program,” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/secureflight/index.shtm  
(accessed 8 September 2008). 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 TSA, “Secure Flight Program,” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/secureflight/index.shtm 
(accessed 2 September 2008). 
195 Shane Harris, “Five Years After 9/11, Question is: Could It Happen Again?” Government 
Executive, 1 September 2006, 
www.governmentexecutive.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=34922&ref=rellink (accessed 4 November 
2007). 
196 Mark G. Stewart, “A Risk and Cost-Benefit Assessment of United States Aviation Security 
Measures,” http://cryptome.org/avsec-assess.pdf (accessed 8 September 2008), 7.  
 46
the U.S. prior to 2001.197 The passengers of United Airlines flight 93 demonstrated the 
ferocity and determination of an aware American flying public when they stormed the 
hijackers in an attempt to regain control of the aircraft before it crashed near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania.  Richard Reid, the notorious shoe bomber was restrained by passengers on 
an international flight in late 2001 after he tried to detonate explosives in his shoes.  It is 
almost certain that passengers today would follow the example of Flight 93 and resist any 
attempt to take over an airliner. “Indeed, passengers are probably the best line of defense 
currently available in civil aviation.”198  For this reason alone, the likelihood that a 
terrorist organization would calculate that it could successfully hijack a commercial jet 
and employ it as a weapon has declined to the point where it is probably unrealistic for 
them to consider airliners “soft targets.” 
D. IMPROVEMENTS IN GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY 
There was a lot of concern immediately after 9/11 that terrorists may use small 
aircraft to attack targets in America so the federal government also made improvements 
to general aviation (GA) security in addition to improving the safety of commercial 
airlines.  Small aircraft do not pose the kind of threat represented by large commercial 
jets are not subject to the same kinds of safeguards that surround airliners. 
General aviation includes more than 550,000 pilots who fly 200,000 privately 
owned aircraft out of over 19,000 airports in America.199  More than 5,400 communities 
rely solely on GA for their air transportation requirements.200  General aviation 
contributes more than $65 billion to our economy each year.201  These aircraft transport 
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“critical-care medical patients, donor organs, blood supplies, overnight cargo, financial 
documents as well as providing security for electric transmission lines and petroleum/gas 
pipelines.202  
TSA formed a General Aviation Security Advisory Committee in 2003.  The 
committee was made up of industry stakeholders such as the 398,000-member Aircraft 
Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) and General Aviation Manufacturers 
Association.  They were tasked with the responsibility for “recommending actions to 
close potential security gaps in general aviation.”203  These organizations have agreed to 
a series of voluntary “best practices” security measures and made recommendations for 
additional improvements designed to enhance security.”204  Some of the 
recommendations include:  
• Additional airspace restrictions around critical infrastructure and at 
various locations throughout the country when intelligence indicates a 
heighten security threat.  
• New difficult-to-counterfeit pilot certificates that include a photograph of 
the pilot.  
• A government review of existing and new pilot certificates to ensure none 
of the pilots are on the terrorist watch lists.  
• Thorough identity checks on people renting or purchasing aircraft.   
• Increased airport security including additional fencing, entry control 
points, surveillance systems, local police presence, and additional 
vigilance along with security awareness training for ground crews and 
pilots.  
• Aircraft owners and operators have taken additional steps to prevent the 
theft of their valuable planes.  These measures have been effective because 
there have been “no terrorist attacks anywhere in the world using a general 
aviation aircraft” and the number of GA aircraft stolen in America was 
down by over 50% from 13 in 2002 to only six aircraft in 2003.205 
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The GA industry associations oppose more severe restrictions because they do not 
believe that small planes pose a significant risk to the country.  Former TSA 
administrator Adm. James M. Loy told a congressional hearing that “in the emotional 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, some security officials may have overstated the threat from 
general aviation.”206  
Over 70% of GA aircraft are single-engine machines with six or fewer seats.  A 
typical four seat Cessna 172 “weighs less than a Honda Civic and carries even less cargo” 
compared to “Boeing 767 that can weigh more than 400,000 pounds and carry some 
25,000 gallons of fuel.207   
The January 2002 suicide crash of a Cessna into an office building resulted in 
limited damage and no collateral deaths or injuries (see Figure 14).  General aviation 
industry associations believe that this incident “demonstrates the ineffectiveness of a GA 
aircraft as a terrorist weapon.”208   
Nuclear safety and security expert Robert M. Jefferson concluded that even an 
explosive-laden GA aircraft would not likely cause the release of radiation if it hit a 
nuclear power plant.209 As a test, a remote controlled, 45,000 pound F-4 Phantom jet was 
“flown at 450 miles per hour into a concrete wall simulating a nuclear containment vessel 
resulting in the aircraft being destroyed while the concrete wall was uncompromised.”210  
According to AOPA, an F-4 is 18 times heavier than a Cessna 172 and even in a dive, a 
Cessna 172 cannot go much faster than 200 mph.211 




209 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, “APOPA-commissioned report concludes general aviation 
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Figure 14.   Cessna hit a building in Tampa, FL.  Flown by a suicidal teenager.212 
Congress has acknowledged the unique security challenges that general aviation 
faces and recommends a risk-based assessment of the threats and vulnerabilities for GA 
airports around the country.213  This congressional support will allow airports to tailor 
security upgrades to their individual needs and access to much needed federal security 
grants.214 
E. RISK ASSESSMENT: HOW LIKELY IS ANOTHER 9/11 HIJACKING?   
Risk in homeland security “can be described by three fundamental factors: threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence.”215  These factors impact America’s airline industry and 
risk of a terrorist hijacking.   
1. Threat 
There is no single, universally accepted, definition of terrorism.  Terrorism is 
defined in the Code of Federal Regulation as “the unlawful use of force and violence 
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against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political of social objectives” (28 C.F.R. 
Section 0.85).  
There is a lot of debate over the issue of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and 
the threat to our homeland.  Many of the official intelligence estimates are classified and 
the unclassified intelligence estimates and official statements are very vague about 
specific threats.  DHS notes, “there is not credible, specific intelligence suggesting an 
imminent threat to the homeland at this time” and their Homeland Security Threat 
Assessment for 2008-2013 makes no mention of threats to aviation at all, yet the debate 
rages over whether we are doing too much or not enough to protect America.216   
There were 3,178 terrorism-related deaths in the U.S. between 1980 and 2005.217  
Approximately 98% of the deaths resulted from just two incidents, Oklahoma City 
Federal building bombing in 1995 and 9/11.  Despite the undoubted tragedy of these 
incidents, their equally obvious rarity has raised the question, in the minds of some 
observers, whether we are “Trapped in a War on Terror” as Ian S. Lustick claims in his 
book.  Lustick says that the government is “…stoking the public fears and attracting vast 
political and economic resources in response to them, the War on Terror encourages, 
indeed virtually compels, every interest group in the country to advance its own agendas 
as crucial for winning the war.”218 “The magnitude of securing the homeland can be 
brought home simply by looking at the millions of potential terrorist targets in the 
U.S.”219  Lustick believes the effort to “master the unlimited catastrophes” is diverting  
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and distorting the military.220  The GWOT is costing the U.S. taxpayers as much as $2 
trillion yet the odds of being killed by lighting are almost twice as great as being attacked 
by a terrorist in America.221 
The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) states, “the U.S. Homeland will 
face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years”… primarily from 
Islamic terrorist groups.222  There is no question that our adversaries hope that this is 
true.  Al-Qa’ida masterminded the 9/11 attacks and has expressed its determination to 
strike again.  Terrorists certainly have both the intent and capability to attack America 
and want the biggest bang for their buck without exposing their plan ahead of time.  
Attacking the airline industry again will have an effect on our critical transportation 
infrastructure and get the terrorist the international publicity they desire.  But, there are 
literally thousands of critical infrastructure targets around the country that they could 
strike that are less “hardened” and would net a similar result (i.e., power, water, food, 
communications, rail, shipping, etc).  The U.S. annual intelligence community budget is 
over $44 billion, with most of the money and effort being focused on evaluating the 
terrorist threat and trying to determine where they will strike next.223  It is of course a 
mistake to assume that the scale of efforts to anticipate and avert another attack is a 
measure of the likelihood that such an attack will or can occur.  It is, however, a measure 
of the anxiety that the terrorist threat has inspired among policy makers; and there is little 
reason to expect it to subside anytime soon. 
2. Vulnerability  
A target’s vulnerability “depends on such factors as target hardness or single point 
failures, as well as redundancy and reconstitution capability.”224 Increased security 
measures in the airline industry can act as a deterrent to reduce vulnerability and risk. A 
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2005 study of hijackings between 1946 and 1985 showed that prospective hijacker’s are 
not likely to proceed if they think they will fail.225  Success is defined when hijackers 
gain control of the plane and reach their destination.226  The Figure below shows how 
successful hijackings decreased in the U.S. compared to the trends in rest of the world 
starting in early 1973.  That year, metal detectors and law enforcement officers were 
added to the U.S. screening checkpoints (the outlier exceptions to the trend were 1975, 
1980, and 1983).227   
 
Figure 15.   U.S. and Non-U.S. Successful Hijackings, 1946-1985228 
Since 9/11, TSA has created the “20 Layers of Security” to reduce the airline 
industry’s vulnerability.  The layers are designed to help deter and prevent future terrorist 
hijacking, provide defense in depth of our airline transportation industry, and protect the 
traveling public.  Fourteen of the 20 security layers are considered “pre-boarding” 
measures while the six remaining measures are categorized as “in-flight” security 
improvements.  The in-flight improvements can be grouped into three areas including 
crew and passenger resistance, hardened cockpit doors, and the Federal Air Marshal 
Service. This next section will offer an assessment of the security measures implemented 
to reduce risk and vulnerability.   
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Even though there have been “no successful hijacking anywhere in the world 
since 9/11,” this analysis will assume that the sum of all 14 “pre-boarding” TSA 
measures reduce the risk (R) of hijacking by an estimated 49%.229  The three categories 
of “in-flight” efforts reduce the risk by another 50% (or 16.67% each) for a total of 99% 
risk reduction effectiveness.230 One hundred percent risk reduction is unrealistic as there 
are inherent uncertainties in trying to quantify the effectiveness of security measures.  
Despite the fact that crew and passenger resistance is arguably, the most effective of all 
measures, for simplicity, it is assigned the same 16.67% value as the other three in-flight 
measures.  Because Federal Air Marshal Service agents are only on about 5% of the 
flights in America, the program is considered less than 1% effective (16.67 x .05 = 
0.83%).  The sum for the three in-flight security efforts is 34.17%.  
Overall, TSA’s 20 pre-boarding and in-flight security measures, along with 
heightened passenger awareness, reduce our vulnerability to hijackings by approximately 
83% when compared to pre-9/11 risk levels (see Table 1).  The assumptions for this 
calculation and estimates for the effectiveness of TSA’s security measures may be overly 
optimistic as there are many uncertainties to consider when calculating risk, but at least 
this provides a starting point for future debate.   
R (pre-boarding security) =        49.00% 
R (crew and passenger resistance) =   16.67% 
R (hardened cockpit doors) =       16.67% 
R (Federal Air Marshal Service) =        0.83%   
              Total= 83.17% Effectiveness 
Table 1.   Security Measures and Associated Vulnerability (Risk) Reduction231 
3. Consequence 
The consequence of a successful terrorist attack can be quantified by calculating 
the potential loss of life, property, and the indirect economic impact.232   Quantifying 
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consequence allows us to rank order the risk of various types of attacks while allocating 
our finite risk mitigation resources.  The immediate consequence of the 9/11 attacks were 
the loss of over 3000 lives and a direct cost of $27.2 billion for physical assets, lost 
revenue, lost jobs, and the cleanup.233  The long-term consequence for the airline 
industry has been an estimated $40 billion in indirect losses in revenue as a result of the 
attacks and high fuel prices.234 Whether similarly spectacular results can be achieved in 
the future is a matter of speculation.  We no longer live in a world in which hijackers are 
assumed to be interested in ransom, and as a consequence their ability to gain and 
maintain control of an aircraft they have seized has been significantly reduced.  
Realistically, the most likely result of a terrorist hijacking is not likely to extend beyond 
the destruction of the aircraft and the death of everyone on board, an undoubted calamity 
by any standard, but not the sort of event that could be expected to alter the political or 
social fabric of our country. 
F. CONCLUSION 
It is unrealistic to think that all security measures can be 100% effective and that 
terrorist attacks on the airline industry can be totally eliminated.  Even the National 
Security Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes “that the future is uncertain and that 
we cannot envision or prepare for every potential threat, we must understand and accept a 
certain level of risk as a permanent condition.”235   
But, what is an acceptable level of risk and when do we know that we have 
succeeded in winning the war on terror?  According the Brookings Institution, winning 
the war will not mean “the complete elimination of any possible terrorist threat…but 
rather the reduction of the risk of terrorism to such a level that it does not significantly 
affect average citizens’ daily lives, preoccupy their thoughts, or provoke 
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overreaction.”236  At a certain point, “even the terrorist will realize their violence is 
futile” once they accept that the economic losses as a result of their attacks will be short 
lived because of our resilient infrastructure, institutions, and economy.237  It is difficult to 
say if we have reached that point in our efforts to secure the airline and general aviation 
industry but we have certainly come a long way in improving the confidence and safety 
of the flying public since September 2001. 
Despite the risk mitigation improvements in aviation security there is no end in 
sight for Operation Noble Eagle.  Brig. Gen David E. Clary, former Air Force homeland 
security director, noted in an interview that “we as a nation have come a long way, but 
have a long way to go.” “Success, however is hard to measure, there is not much instant 
gratification available when operating in a defensive posture.”  General Clary continued 
by saying, “there have not been any successful attacks within the United States since 
9/11, but have we negated the threat…at this point…who knows?”238  Canadian Air 
Force Lt. Gen. Eric A. Findley, former deputy commander of NORAD believes “Noble 
Eagle is here for the long haul and is going to be an enduring mission,” continuing until 
someone can say the “threat” has been reduced, “and we can go back to something a little 
less rigorous.”239 
The next chapter will address the financial cost of Noble Eagle and its impact on 
the Air Force’s combat capability.   
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V. THE COST AND IMPACT OF OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE  
A. THE FINANCIAL COST OF OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE 
By December 2007, Congress had approved over $700 billion in direct 
appropriations for the Global War on Terror (GWOT).240  According to Congressional 
testimony, the total cost of the war may end up over $2.7 trillion.241  Operation Noble 
Eagle has received $28.7 billion in direct congressional supplemental funding (see Table 
below).242  Much of the supplemental funding was used to pay for the Reserve and Guard 
forces called up to help support the operation as well as the combat air patrols that cost 




FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FYO7 FYO8 TOTAL
DoD $13.0B $8.0B $3.7B $2.1B $0.8B $0.5B $0.5 $28.7B 
Table 2.   Congressional Budget for Operation Noble Eagle FY 2001-2008244 
According to these figures from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
monthly average for ONE supplemental funding dropped from $520 million in FY2003 
to around $45 million in FY2007.  The congressional funding declined for ONE as “one-
time costs ended and other costs have been incorporated in day-to-day operations.”245  
Beginning in FY2005, DoD started funding Noble Eagle in its baseline operation and 
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maintenance (O&M) budget rather that with congressional supplemental GWOT 
funding.246  This accounting effort allowed congress to shrink their direct supplemental 
contributions to $500 million in FY2007 for ONE.247  The Air Force is now responsible 
for funding the bulk of NORAD’s C3 structure (personnel and equipment), along with the 
ANG alert bases, and the National Special Security Event CAPs from their annual DoD 
budget.  Therefore, the CRS claim of $45 million a month is not an accurate figure for 
what Operation Noble Eagle is actually costing but rather just what congress is paying 
directly to supplement the mission.  The $45 million does not include the Air Force’s 
total O&M cost.  Estimates from the Air Force’s accounting office have run as high as 
$200 million a month, just to support CAPs for ONE.248 
The actual cost for all the DoD personnel and ANG alert bases participating in 
ONE is difficult to estimate but there are some figures available for flying hour costs and 
facilities upgrades.   
Over 184,000 flight hours have been flown in support of Operation Noble 
Eagle.249  The average Air Force fighter cost $19,400 per flight hour in 2007 and has 
increased at a rate of 9.8% per year since 2003.250  An air refueling tanker costs $14,300 
per hour and an AWACS command and control aircraft costs an average of $44,500 per 
hour to operate.251  The price per flight hour includes mission personnel, unit level 
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NORAD has invested a significant amount of money in facilities and equipment 
upgrades since 9/11.  They spent over $700 million after 9/11 to upgrade the “attack 
warning systems within Cheyenne Mountain, CO.”253  That cost does not include the 
corresponding upgrades to the C3 facilities at CONR, WADS, and EADS.  Admiral Tim 
Keating, former Commander of USNORTHCOM/NORAD had his headquarters at 
Peterson AFB, CO.  In 2006 he said “I can’t be in two places at one time” so he decided 
to put the newly renovated Cheyenne Mountain facility on “warm standby” after they 
determined a surprise missile attack by China or Russia was very unlikely.254  NORAD 
started moving their operations to Peterson AFB (east of Colorado Springs) in May, 2008 
at an initial cost of over $47 million in order to “improve unity of effort and command” 
with USNORTHCOM headquarters.255  U.S. Senator Wayne Allard from Colorado 
estimates NORAD’s move to Peterson AFB may end up costing over $12 billion.256 
B. NOBLE EAGLE’S IMPACT ON TRAINING AND COMBAT 
CAPABILITY 
This research did not uncover any official studies that linked Operation Noble 
Eagle to a reduction in training opportunities for fighter squadrons and the resulting 
reduction in combat capability, but there is a lot of anecdotal evidence as well as past 
experience with similar military operations.  Interviews and email exchanges were 
conducted with personnel from five active duty and ANG operational fighter squadrons 
while researching this section.    
1. Air Force Training and Proficiency Requirements for Fighter Pilots 
Headquarters Air Combat Command’s (ACC) Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) “is 
designed to codify the training-sortie rates needed for pilot proficiency and thereby create 
planning factors for sortie rates and the ability to justify flying hour budgets” for 
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operational fighter squadrons.257  The goal of the RAP program is to “develop and 
maintain a high state of mission readiness for immediate and effective employment 
across the range of military operations.”258  Air Force Instructions mandate that 
squadrons use their flying hours to “achieve optimum training” and “maintain wartime 
readiness.”259   
Each major weapon system in the ACC has its own specific RAP requirements 
based on their assigned mission.  The RAP dictates the minimum number, frequency, and 
types of training sorties required for pilots to maintain their combat mission ready (CMR) 
status.  A CMR pilot is considered to be qualified and proficient in all of the primary 
missions tasked to their assigned unit and weapons system.260  A basic mission capable 
(BMC) pilot is familiar with all, and may be qualified and proficient in only some of the 
primary missions.261  BMC pilots do not fly as often or deploy regularly with the 
operational squadrons because they normally attached to flying squadrons but actually 
work in wing supervision or staff functions on base.262  Pilots who fail to meet the 
minimums will regress to non-CMR/BMC status.  They will then be required to fly 
additional sorties and accomplish extra training to re-qualify for CMR/BMC status.   
 
Table 3.   ACC F-15C Ready Aircrew Program Mission Requirements (20-Month Cycle)263 
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An inexperienced USAF fighter pilot is one with fewer than 500 flight hours in 
his/her weapons system. An inexperienced F-15 or F-16 pilot in ACC is required to fly a 
minimum of 10 RAP missions each month, 30 missions in 90 days, and 210 RAP 
missions during a 20-month cycle (see Table 3 above).264  An experienced (more than 
500 hours) pilot is required to fly nine RAP missions each month.  Sitting alert and flying 
endless circles in the sky during air patrol in support of Operation Noble Eagle offers 
little training value for the fighter squadrons and pilots involved.  According to Major 
General John Baker, former assistant deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, “a 
fighter pilot on a CAP mission gets to practice the tasks of managing his fuel and doing 
tanking (air refueling) procedures but not much else.”265 Therefore, Operation Noble 
Eagle missions are considered non-demanding contingency missions and do not count as 
Ready Aircrew Program sorties for the pilots because of their limited training value.   
2. Noble Eagle’s Impact on a Fighter Squadron’s Combat Capability 
The U.S. Air Force is slowly reducing the number of fighter squadrons in the 
continental United States (CONUS).  For example, in 2001 there were seven active duty 
operational F-15C squadrons in the CONUS.  Today, there are four and by October 2010, 
there will only be one active duty operational Eagle squadron in the CONUS.  There are a 
lot fewer jets and pilots to support Noble Eagle but NORAD and CONR’s demand for 
support has not changed much in the last four year.  The result has been more Operation 
Noble Eagle combat air patrols and fewer training sorties for the remaining pilots.   
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) noted that “during Operation Noble 
Eagle, DoD provides enhanced combat air patrols which generally require only basic 
skills needed but offer little opportunity to practicing the varied combat skills needed for 
wartime proficiency.”266 Therefore, “the critical skills necessary for combat proficiency 
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will atrophy without constant training and combat units are unable to maintain 
proficiency in combat flying skills when performing domestic Noble Eagle missions.”267 
A senior Air Force official said he “worries that when the Noble Eagle pilots come up for 
their turn on an overseas deployment, their skills won’t be up to our normal 
standards.”268   
The Noble Eagle alert commitments and air patrols take jets, experienced flight 
leads, and instructors away from the squadrons causing an interruption of training for all 
the aircrew, but especially the junior pilots. Most active duty Air Force flying squadrons 
are manned at 100% but usually 60% or more of the assigned pilots are considered 
“inexperienced” with fewer than 500 flight hours.  Active duty Air Force squadrons do 
not get additional flight hours from the Air Force (DoD) to support Noble Eagle so the 
ONE sorties and flying hours are subtracted from of the individual squadron’s annual 
training budget.269   
Fewer flight hours for training adds additional stress on squadrons who are trying 
to maintain their pilot’s proficiency.  Especially when “desperate to save money,” the 
USAF cut another 10% from its flying hour program in 2008.270  An average pilot is 
assigned to a CONUS squadron for two to three years.   Active duty USAF squadrons are 
constantly struggling to train and upgrade combat ready pilots during that two to three 
year period, yet, “not all aircrews are meeting their minimum training levels.”271 Using 
valuable flying hours while orbiting in CAPs over the United States in support of ONE 
prevents pilots from preparing to fly and fight America’s future wars against advanced 
tactical and asymmetric threats. 
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Operation Noble Eagle missions and support deployments have a long-term 
cascading effect on the readiness of the squadrons tasked to participate.  A typical fighter 
squadron schedules about 290 training sorties a month but actually flies around 260 
flights (~312 flight hours) due to maintenance attrition and weather. A squadron flying 
Noble Eagle air patrols over a weekend averages 36 sorties and 234 flight hours at a cost 
of over $4.5 million (~75%) of the squadron’s monthly flying hour budget.272  As a 
general rule of thumb, almost none of the squadron’s pilots will make RAP during a 
month when the squadron supports more than three days of Noble Eagle CAP missions 
from home base.273  A single deployment during a month also guarantees only a handful 
of the pilots will make RAP for at least one, and maybe up to three months depending on 
the duration and the number of jets taken on the deployment.  According to one squadron 
commander, “Operation Noble Eagle is an ugly baby, I hate it.”274 
In August 2008, an active duty Air Combat Command squadron was ordered to 
take six of their 18 jets along with 10 of their 30 pilots to an off-site location to support 
Noble Eagle alert and CAP missions for two weeks.275  The deployment’s impact on the 
squadron lasted for months.  The daily flight training at the home base was reduced by 
60% during the squadron’s deployment.  None of the deployed pilots were able fly 
training missions.  The pilots who stayed at home were only able to fly once or twice 
during the two week deployment.  As a result, 40.9% of the pilots did not make their 
minimum ACC Ready Aircrew Program requirements for the month of August.276  The 
squadron was still recovering from the deployment almost 90 days later (October 2008) 
when 31.8% of the squadron’s pilots were still not able to meet the minimum CMR 
training requirement.277  This was because the squadron simply did not have enough jets 
and sorties available to quickly make up for the lost two weeks of training in August.  
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Another active duty ACC squadron deployed four jets, pilots, and personnel to a 
location within the continental U.S. for four months to support an ONE alert commitment 
for an ANG squadron that had lost its certification in a readiness inspection.278  No 
training sorties were flown at the deployed location, so all the pilots had to rotate back to 
home base every two weeks to maintain their basic flying currencies.279 
The detrimental impact of deployments and long operations on fighter squadrons 
is not new for the Air Force.  In 1999, it took the Air Force over 18 months to recover 
from the 78-day Balkans operation because of the “missed training, absence of instructors 
for new recruits (pilots), and missed rest and recuperation for the troops.”280 
3. Noble Eagle’s Impact on Maintenance 
Alert commitments, deployed operations, and long flight hours in the CAPs not 
only impact the pilots but also require a huge effort from maintenance.  Aircraft 
maintenance personnel have some of the highest deployment rates of any job specialty in 
the Air Force.281 To support deployed operations, maintenance must send an average of 
10-14 personnel per jet. These numbers including supervisors, and crew chiefs along with 
specialists for weapons, fuels, sheet metal, hydraulics, avionics, life support, etc. The 
deployments leave fewer maintainers at home to service the jets and support local flying. 
A typical F-15C fighter squadron flies 18 training sorties each day.  Two days of 
flying Noble Eagle missions from home base actually cost a squadron four days of flight 
training because maintenance removes the jets from the flying schedule in order to 
service them at least one day before the ONE mission begins.282  Maintenance also loads 
live missiles, bullets, and extra fuel tanks during this downtime.  Twenty-four hour CAPs 
from home base require maintenance and operations to adjust their work schedules 
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to support both day and night missions.  After the ONE missions are over, maintenance 
removes the jets from the flying schedule for another day to download the live weapons 
and reconfigure the aircraft for training at the cost of another day of training sorties. 
Each jet goes into a periodic phase inspection about every 200 hours.  The phase 
inspections can last anywhere from three days to two weeks.  The additional long flight 
hours in the ONE CAPs accelerate the flow of the jets into phase maintenance causing a 
backlog.  The backlog of phase jets increases the workload for the maintainers at home 
station and reduces the number of aircraft available for operational flight training.  
The Air Force’s fighter fleet has an average age of 20 years.283  The service is 
keeping its “aging F-15s and F-16s flying beyond their anticipated retirement dates by 
sinking billions into additional service-life extension programs and upgrades.”284 The 
long hours in the CAPs are putting additional stain on the airframes, engines, and supply 
of spare parts.  A clear indication of the age and stress on the fleet occurred in November, 
2007 when an F-15C from the St. Louis, MO ANG broke in half in mid-air.  The entire 
F-15 fleet was grounded worldwide for months to allow maintenance inspections and 
repairs on defective and fatigued metal beams in the aircraft’s frames.285  According to 
Major General Baker, Air Force logistics experts are “closely watching the hours being 
accumulated by F-15s and F-16s and without question, there will have to be a major 
infusion of more money for spare parts and additional maintenance” to sustain the fleet in 
the future.286 
4. Noble Eagle’s Impact on the Air National Guard 
The Noble Eagle mission also adds to the Air National Guard’s workload.  Most 
of the 16 ANG squadrons that sit 24/7/365 alert are also expected to prepare for and 
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support Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.  F-16 
fighter squadrons like the 121st at Andrews AFB, MD have deployed overseas at least 
twice since 9/11.287  The alert mission requires these squadrons to put a minimum of two 
pilots and three jets on alert at all times, along with maintenance and support personnel.  
That means those jets and pilots are not available for AEF spin-ups and take a “big bite 
out of local training” according to their squadron commander.288   
The Air Guard is able to handle the demands of the alert missions and AEFs 
deployment better than the active duty by having fewer mandated BMC/CMR mission 
requirements for their pilots (see Figure below).  They also rely heavily on the experience 
level of their maintainers and aircrew “who average twice the flight hours of pilots in 
most active duty Air Force fighter squadrons” but that experience level is dropping.289  
The high operations tempo and overseas deployments are starting to put a strain on the 
ANG’s recruiting and retention rates.  Over 90,000 ANG personnel have deployed in 
support of the GWOT since 9/11.290  Over 48% of pilots are turning down bonuses and 
leaving the Air Force after their initial pilot training commitment expires.291  “Trying to 
keep guys in the service…has been a challenge” according to Lt Col David Miles, air 
sovereignty alert Commander for the 113th Wing at Andrew AFB.292 
 
 
Table 4.   ANG F-15C RAP Mission Requirements (20 Month Cycle)293 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Over $28 billion, 54,000 sorties, and 184,000 flight hours have been expended in 
support of Operation Noble Eagle.  It is clear that ONE has cost a great deal in terms of 
money and impact on the people and the squadrons who execute the mission but it is not 
clear if there is a corresponding benefit for the effort.  Success is hard to measure while 
operating in a defensive posture.  Especially when there have not been any terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. using aircraft and the Department of Homeland Security’s own 
aviation threat level advisory system says “there is no credible, specific intelligence 
suggesting an imminent threat to the homeland at this time.”294   
The U.S. Air Force is struggling to fund its current manpower needs to support 
the GWOT and recapitalize an ageing aircraft fleet.  The average age of all the USAF’s 
aircraft is 24 years and the service needs to buy a minimum of 164 new aircraft every 
year just to maintain the status quo.295  The cost to fly and maintain the aging fleet has 
increase by almost 80% in the last 10 years.296   
Seven years of Noble Eagle missions have put a strain on all squadrons trying to 
keep their pilots combat mission ready. It is difficult to quantify exactly what the cost of 
the ONE missions have been in terms of degraded combat capability and readiness.  But, 
it is clear that the squadrons involved have given up thousands of valuable training sorties 
and almost 200,000 thousand flight hours to support Noble Eagle at some expense to 
their pilots combat mission ready (CMR) status.   
The next chapter will review alternative aircraft and ground based air defense 
(GBAD) systems available for Noble Eagle Support.  Each system will be evaluated 
based on their availability and utility as a more cost effective alternative for homeland air 
defense in lieu of using USAF fighters, AWACS, and airborne tankers. 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
A. GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS  
There are a number of capable and cost effective ground based air defense 
(GBAD) systems available for use in homeland air defense. The GBAD systems could be 
permanently positioned or moved around the country to augment NORAD’s alert fighters 
in lieu of costly combat air patrols to protect National Special Security Events (NSSEs), 
critical infrastructure, and Presidential visits.  Most of these air defense assets are mobile 
and have both lethal and non-lethal capabilities that could contribute to an integrated air 
defense system (IADS) along with existing alert aircraft.  Many of these systems are 
already being used in the National Capital Region (NCR).   
1. Lethal GBAD System 
 
Figure 16.   Patriot Missile System297 
The Patriot missile is arguably the U.S. Army’s most famous and effective air 
defense system.  The Patriot PAC-2 is a long-range (~100 miles), “all-altitude, all-
weather air defense system designed to intercept tactical ballistic missiles, cruise 
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missiles, UAVs, and advanced aircraft.”298  The Patriot system is controlled by three 
operators who work in the mobile Integrated Fire Control Station (IFCS).299 The 
operators get instructions from higher headquarters through data link and VHF radios.300  
Targeting information can be passed to the operators from headquarters or they can 
operate autonomously with the systems integrated phased array radar.  The radar 
performs search, detection, track, target identification, along with missile tracking and 
guidance. The Patriot can track up to 100 targets and provide missile guidance for up to 
nine missiles simultaneously.301 159 Patriots were launched against SCUD missiles 
during Desert Storm in 1991.302  The U.S. Army claims a 70% intercept success rate 
during that conflict and has made significant improvements to the system since Desert 
Storm.303  The U.S. Army controls over 770 Patriot missiles.304   
 
 
Figure 17.   Surface Launched (SL) AMRAAM305 
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The Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile 
(SLAMRAAM) is based on the successful Mach 4, AIM-120 missile system developed 
by Raytheon for fighter aircraft.  The SLAMRAAM costs $2.6 million and is mounted on 
the versatile High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV).306  The 
HMMWV gets about eight miles per gallon and can be driven or transported anywhere in 
the country to support Noble Eagle air defense at a fraction of the cost of flying fighters 
and tankers.  For example, driving a HMMWV to Washington, D.C. from El Paso, TX 
would cost about $750 in fuel vs. an F-15 from the same location would cost almost 
$80,000.307  Getting the mobile GBAD systems in place and on time at special events 
would require additional advanced planning and coordination by NORAD. 
 
Figure 18.   Sentinel Mobile Radar308 
An Integrated Fire Control Station provides Battle Management Command, 
Control, Computer, Communication and Intelligence to the SLAMRAAM operators.309  
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The operators use targeting information from off-board air defense networks including 
the Patriot, as well as the system’s autonomous Sentinel mobile radar that can track 
targets out to 50 miles and engage hostile airborne threats at 20 miles..310  
   
Figure 19.   Avenger and Stinger Missile Systems311 
The Sentinel radar can also pass targeting information to the U.S. Army’s 
Avenger Low Level Air Defense System.  The Avenger has a crew of two (driver and 
gunner) and uses a .50 caliber automatic machine gun along with eight Stinger heat 
seeking missiles.  The .50 caliber machine gun is mounted on the right side of the turret 
and holds 200 rounds of ammunition.312 The Stinger is a 35 pound, Mach 2.2 missile 
with a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet at a range of five miles.313  Targets can be 
acquired and the missiles cued by radar, optical sight, or by a Forward Looking Infrared 
(FLIR) mounted on the left side of the turret.314  An eye-safe laser rangefinder is used to 
determine targeting range when engaging optically.  The U.S. Army currently has about 
800 Avengers in service and over 13,400 shoulder fired Man-Portable Air Defense 
(MANPAD) Stinger missiles (see Figure 19 above).315  
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Figure 20.   CG-47 TICONDEROGA-class AEGIS cruiser316 
The U.S. Navy has 27 CG-47 TICONDEROGA-class AEGIS guided missile 
cruisers.317  They are obviously not “ground” based but could be used effectively to 
provide 24 hour air defense near coastal areas (e.g., Cape Canaveral or in the Chesapeake 
Bay near Washington D.C.) to protect NSSEs from aerial attacks at a cost of 
approximately $8,100 per hour to operate.318  Each cruiser is equipped with a SPY-1 
electronically scanned radar that automatically detects and tracks aircraft at over 200 
miles and can engage them if necessary with their long range SAM system.319   
The capabilities of the AEGIS ballistic missile defense system were proven in for 
the first time in February 2008 when the cruiser Lake Erie, based at Pearl Harbor shot 
down a U.S. spy satellite that had lost power and become unstable.320   
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2. Non-Lethal GBAD Systems 
 
Figure 21.   Aerostat Balloon321 
Concerns about gaps in low altitude radar coverage are one of NORAD’s 
justifications for having fighters in CAPs over special events and critical 
infrastructure.  The fighters use their on-board radars to help NORAD search for low 
altitude “threats” and sanitize the airspace around the areas of interest.  The tethered 
Aerostat Balloon system contains a radar that could be used to help contribute to 
NORADs common air picture over recurring National Security Special Events 
(NSSEs) like space shuttle launches, POTUS movements to Camp David, and around 
critical infrastructure like the National Capital Region.  The balloon can be raised to 
an altitude of 15,000 feet where it is able detect and track aircraft at over 200 nautical 
miles.322   The radar data is transmitted to the ground station below to be digitized 
and fed to the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and NORAD control centers.323  The 
CBP has used the tethered Aerostat system since 1985 along America’s southern 
border to help detect illegal drug trafficking flights entering the country at low 
altitude.  Intelligence reports indicate a “dramatic decrease” in the amount of airborne 
drug trafficking since the Aerostats first went up above Ft Huachuca, AZ.324  Stephen 
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Duncan, DoD’s former coordinator for drug enforcement policy called the Aerostats 
“the most cost-effective counternarcotics detection, monitoring, and deterrent 
asset.”325  The Aerostat system could be used as a visible stand-alone deterrent to 
terrorism along with existing ANG alert fighters at NSSEs or in conjunction with a 
lethal GBAD system.   
The U.S. Air Force consolidated the management contract for all the Aerostats 
in 1992.326  They currently operate ten systems along the southern border at a cost of 
about $3.5 million each per year, which is less than the cost for one weekend of 
fighter CAPs.327  
 
Figure 22.   Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP)328 
The Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP) is a smaller, more mobile system 
that can be transported anywhere in the country in a portable container that can be loaded 
in the back of a truck or mounted on top of a HMMWV.329 The REAP can be inflated 
and raised to 300 feet in less than five minutes; then remain airborne for up to 10 days.330  
The system contains electro-optical and night vision cameras with “an effective 
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surveillance radius of about 18 nautical miles.”331  The REAP can also be equipped with 
VHF/UHF radios and act as a radio relay to improve NORAD’s low altitude line-of-sight 
communication problems at special events.332  
   
Figure 23.   Visual Warning System (VWS) in the National Capital Region333 
The Visual Warning System (VWS) is a new tool developed after 9/11 to 
“communicate” with general aviation pilots who have entered restricted airspace around 
the National Capitol Region without authorization.334  The system uses high-powered 
cameras to help visually identify rouge aircraft and then aim the eye-safe, red-green laser 
beam.335  Pilots are who see the lights directed at them are expected to immediately 
change their course and contact air traffic control as they exit the restricted airspace.    
The VWS would be very cost effective system since the majority of fighter 
scrambles and CAP intercepts are directed against harmless general aviation pilots who 
have inadvertently entered restricted airspace or simply lost radio communication.  The 
VWS could be mounted on a mobile platform and deployed to all NSSEs to augment a 
mobile GBAD and the ANG’s alert fighters as an alternative to fighter CAPs.   
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B. OTHER AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR AIR DEFENSE 
There are a number of other DoD and federally owned aircraft that could be used 
for ground alert and air patrols in support of Operation Noble Eagle.   
Helicopters for example have the flexibility to land almost anywhere near the 
POTUS or at an NSSE.  The choppers could be scrambled within minutes from inside the 
restricted airspace to intercept general aviation aircraft that get too close or stray into the 
restricted zone.  Most helicopters are not equipped with radars but could get vectors from 
NORAD (WADS/EADS) and use their on-board optical systems to intercept targets of 
interest (TOI).  The helicopter crews could visually identify, assess hostile intent, offer 
assistance, and escort the TOI out of the restricted airspace. The armed helicopters would 
be able to engage the TOI with lethal force if the target was exhibiting hostile intent and 
met all the criteria required under the standing Noble Eagle rules of engagement (ROE).  
Unarmed helicopters could still be used but would pass off the hostile TOIs to the ground 
based air defense systems to engage with lethal force if necessary.  The helicopter would 
then return to their designated landing zone in the restricted area and be ready for another 
scramble almost immediately. Using ground base alert helicopters at special events is 
much more cost effective than using fighters and tankers to circle overhead in CAPs.   
The helicopters mentioned below are only a few examples of the types of aircraft 
that could be positioned on the ground at special security events to augment the standard 
ANG alert fighters and/or any mobile GBAD system.   
 
Figure 24.   OH-58 Kiowa Warrior336 
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The U.S. Army’s OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Reconnaissance/Attack helicopter has 
a crew of two and can carry two Stinger heat-seeking missiles at a maximum speed of 
125 knots.337  The pilot aims and cues the Stinger missile using the mast-mounted sight 
or a helmet mounted sighting system.  The mast-mounted sight above the rotor blades 
contains a sensor suite that includes a high-resolution television camera for long-range 
target detection/identification, thermal imaging sensor, and a laser rangefinder.338  The 
Kiowa Warrior can also pass and receive targeting information over an advanced data 
link system.  The Kiowa’s data link could connect to NORADs common air picture for 
additional situational awareness as well as pass/relay air and ground target information to 
a GBAD.  The U.S. Army operates over 400 Kiowa Warriors.339 
 
Figure 25.   AH-64 Apache340 
The Army’s AH-64 Apache is another option for ground alert and air cover over 
special events and critical infrastructure.  The Apache is more heavily armed but has the 
same basic sensors and data link capability as the OH-58D with a maximum speed of 197 
knots.341  The U.S. Army and ARNG currently operate over 800 AH-64s.342   
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Along with most state and local law enforcement agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) has a fleet of about 300 aircraft including 64 HU-25 Guardian fixed wing jets 
and 102 HH-65 Dolphins.343  Each of these aircraft and their law enforcement certified 
crews could assist with Operation Noble Eagle missions around the country.  The USCG 
is considered one of the five U.S. military services and is also a division of the 
Department of Homeland Security, so they would be a natural choice to support 
NORAD’s multi-layered Noble Eagle air defense missions.   
The USCG has actually been participating in a Rotary Wing Air Intercept 
program in the National Capital Region since 2006.344  This program could be expanded 
to include all POTUS visits around the country and other National Special Security 
Events (NSSE).   
 
Figure 26.   HH-65 Dolphin345 
The HH-65 Dolphin is operated by 18 different USCG Air Stations in the 
America as well as in the NCR.346  The aircraft can remain in the air for over three hours 
while cruising at 120 knots and has a top speed of 165 knots.347 The Dolphin is typically 
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unarmed but, as proven in the NCR, is still a viable option for the ground alert role or for 
airborne surveillance at special events.  Like the other helicopters mentioned above, the 
Dolphin could be launched and vectored to intercept general aviation aircraft or UAVs 
violating the restricted airspace around the events at a fraction of the cost of fighter 
CAPs.  The crew could then coordinate with NORAD and the mobile ground based air 
defense systems to engage rouge aircraft if determined to be a threat.  
 
 
Figure 27.   HU-25 Falcon Jet “Guardian”348 
The Coast Guard’s HU-25 Falcon Jet can operate from the surface to 42,000 feet 
with a top speed of Mach .85.349  The HU-25B “Air Eye” is equipped with an F-16 style 
APG-66 air-to-air radar, a FLIR, and pods carrying a side-looking radar (SALR) that is 
used to detect and track targets on the surface.350  The HU-25 has a maximum range of 
1,940 miles and can remain in the air for almost six hours without refueling.351  The 
USCG Falcon Jet costs about $3,700 per hour to operate compared to $19,400 an hour for 
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an average USAF fighter aircraft.352  The HU-25 Air Eye’s low cost, endurance and 
ability to sanitize both the air and ground around NSSEs make it a logical and cost 
effective choice for Operation Noble Eagle missions.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Although a large number of the U.S. Army’s soldiers are deployed to the Middle 
East, the ground based air defense equipment is sitting idle here in the U.S. because there 
are no air threats in Iraq or Afghanistan.  The DoD has access to thousands of 
underutilized lethal and non-lethal GBAD systems as well as aircraft and ships.  A 
combination of these systems could be used as a cost effective and potent joint combined 
arms force to protect America at home.   
A number of these systems are already effectively being used in a layered defense 
around the nation’s capitol.  NORAD seems to be relying simply on fighter alerts and 
CAPs outside the NCR.  If in fact the air threat exists, and NORAD is serious about 
homeland air defense, then there are good reasons for using additional assets for 
Operation Noble Eagle other than just fighters until we have a nation-wide IADS in 
place.  The presence of helicopters, surface to air missile (SAMs), military radars, and/or 
Aerostat balloons would be would be a visible and powerful reminder to general aviation 
pilots to stay clear restricted airspace.  The ground based systems would also be a visible 
deterrent to potential terrorists considering attacking America from the air as well as a 
visible show of force for the American people to demonstrate DoD’s commitment to 
protecting the homeland.   
Using alert helicopters and/or a mobile ground-base air defense system along with 
the existing ANG alert fighters would be a more cost effective layered defense for 
NORAD.  This option would arguably be more of a deterrent to terrorism than flying the 
fighter CAPs out of sight at medium altitude over a POTUS visit, or flying low passes 
over Disney World during a Space Shuttle launch.   
                                                 
352 Harold Kennedy, “Coast Guard Adapts to Larger Homeland Security Mission,” NDIA Business 
and Technology Magazine, August 2003, 
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Using alternative air defense systems for Operation Noble Eagle would reduce the 
number of fighter CAPs needed.  It would also reduce the number of erroneous fighter 
scrambles against miss-guided general aviation aircraft and allow the ANG’s alert 
fighters to focus on the much less likely, but more catastrophic threat from hijacked 
airliners.   
The final chapter will summarize the issues regarding Operation Noble Eagle, 
offer possible academic explanations for the lack of significant change in NORAD’s Cold 
War-style air defense strategy, and make a final policy recommendation.   
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VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
A. CONCLUSION  
The air defense mission and the use of fighter aircraft in America has a long and 
respected history.  Air defense has constantly changed along with threats, capabilities, 
and budgets.  The mission evolved after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor from pure 
air defense to submarine reconnaissance using long-range patrol aircraft after the threat of 
an attack from the air subsided.   Air defense and the use of fighters rose to prominence 
once again in the 1950s due to the ever-present threat of attack from the Soviet Union’s 
bombers, only to see a slow decline starting in the early 1960s as more emphasis was 
placed on ICBMs.  NORAD saw its force decline from its peak in 1961 of over 250,000 
personnel assigned to 8 regions, with 14 air defense artillery gun batteries, 253 air 
defense missile batteries, 22 air divisions, over 2000 fighters and support aircraft, and 65 
fighter/interceptor squadrons, to only seven ANG fighter squadrons with 14 aircraft 
sitting on alert by 2001.353   
NORAD and the ANGs 1st Air Force performance on 9/11 reflected their lack of 
planning and preparation for such an attack.  They have since made significant 
improvements to help keep America safe from another aerial attack.  NORAD has spent 
billions of dollars to add nine additional ANG squadrons to the alert mission, hire 
thousands more personnel, construct/upgrade facilities,  improve interagency 
coordination, modernize and expand their C3 systems, and add combat air patrols. 
The U.S. intelligence community (IC), the international airline industry, and the 
general aviation (GA) community have all also made significant improvements since 
September 2001.   
The IC now has a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to advise the President, 
National Security Council and coordinate efforts among the 16 main U.S. intelligence 
 
                                                 
353 Dawson, 12. 
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agencies.  The DNI is fostering a new philosophy for the “need to share” information 
within the federal, state, and local ICs rather than the pre-9/11 policy of sharing 
information only in cases of “need to know.”   
The airline industry has implemented 20 additional layers of security to deter and 
prevent future hijackings, including the creation of the TSA with approximately 50,000 
employees; along with arguably the most effective deterrent: an aware flying public that 
would not likely sit idle ever again during a hijacking attempt.   
General aviation aircraft are considered to be a lower threat to our critical 
infrastructure due to their smaller size and slower airspeeds.  But, that has not stopped the 
industry from implementing new measures to protect the American public including 
foreign pilot screening, additional security training for GA pilots and ground crews, as 
well as increased security around airports.   
These additional security measures have reduced the risk of another 9/11 
hijacking attack in America but this research could not find a corresponding decrease in 
the number of CAPs being scheduled by NORAD (1st Air Force) in the last six years.  
The Noble Eagle CAPs are using valuable training sorties and have burned over 184,000 
flight hours.354  Statistical data gathered from various fighter squadrons has shown that 
these CAPs are having a detrimental effect on the combat mission readiness status of 
their aircrew.  The CAPs have cost the U.S. Air Force as much as $1.3 billion each year 
with the total cost of the operation at almost $29 billion.355   
There are more cost-effective mobile ground-based air defense (GBAD) systems 
such as those being used in the National Capital Region.  These systems are available to 
support Operation Noble Eagle, but we are continuing to use our finite conventional and 
costly fighter forces instead.    
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355 Amy Belasco, CRS Report for Congress, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on 
Terror Operations Since 9/11, Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
RL33110, 8 February 2008, 19. 
 85
Operation Noble Eagle has become a steady state operation, even though there 
have been no attacks in the last seven years and DHS says, “there is no credible, specific 
intelligence suggesting an imminent threat to the homeland at this time” and their 
strategic assessment plan for 2008-2013 makes no mention of specific threats to 
aviation.356  Bureaucratic politics and path dependence are two academic theories that 
could be applied to help explain why the Noble Eagle CAP missions are still being flown.   
Path dependence occurs when institutions become self-reinforcing.  It can be 
initiated by decisions that at the time seem “inconsequential but lead to uncontrollable 
consequences.”357 Paul Krugman defines path dependence as “the powerful role of 
historical accident in determining the shape of the future.”358 Douglas Puffert says 
“history matters, it has an enduring influence…choices made on the basis of transitory 
conditions can persist long after those conditions change.”359  “Lock-in” is also an 
important concept in the path dependence theory.  It means “having to accept inferior and 
costly standards, even though superior alternatives exist…and, the costs of switching are 
not high.”360   
Bureaucratic politics refers to the popular theory summarized by a phrase first 
coined by Rufus E. Miles, who famously observed, “where you stand depends on where 
you sit.” Though “Miles’ Law” is not specific to security policy, it does portray an 
organizational dynamic in which individual judgments are strongly influenced by the 
institution to which the individual belongs; characterized by careerism and defense of 
individual empires.361 Graham T. Allison states that “one will arrive at different 
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conclusions based on the spectacles one chooses.”362  The bureaucratic politics theory 
offers some insight into why organizations whose funding and existence depend on 
Operation Noble Eagle, keep promoting the mission and why decision makers choose to 
continue flying CAPs.   
The proposition that Noble Eagle CAPs should be flown until someone can say 
the “threat” has been eliminated and we can go back to something a little less rigorous 
will needlessly squander the U.S. Air Force’s limited resources during these challenging 
economic times and adversely affect future combat capabilities.  The fact that we have 
not experienced another 9/11 hijacking or a general aviation terrorist attack in the last 
seven years should not be considered sufficient justification for continuing the status quo 
and keeping the fighter CAPs in the air.  Rather the contrary: it should be a reason to 
consider alternative, more cost-effective long-term solutions.   
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The lack of current intelligence indicating a specific threat to aviation along with 
the high cost of the CAPs and their detrimental effects on the squadrons flying the 
missions leads this research to the conclusion that the CAPs should be discontinued.  The 
CAPs can always be scheduled again in the future if actionable intelligence exists and the 
threat dictates.  In the mean time, the costs for the CAPs outweigh the benefits and the 
program should be shelved while NORAD continues to work with the intelligence 
community to pursue better methods for gathering and assessing intelligence specifically 
for air threats in America.  NORAD also needs to pursue the use of more cost effective, 
long term air defense solutions including the use of both lethal and non-lethal GBAD 
systems for deterrence and defense in the homeland.   
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